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JURISDICTION OBTAINED BY FORCIBLE ABDUCTION: REACH EXCEEDS
DUE PROCESS GRASP
INTRODUCTION
State and federal courts have long sanctioned a
unique form of lawlessness by assuming jurisdiction
over the person of a criminal defendant whom law
enforcement officials have illegally apprehended and
forcibly brought into their jurisdiction. I Courts have
exhibited an almost universal adherence to a century
old doctrine maintaining that the power of a govern-
ment to prosecute a defendant is not impaired by the
illegality of the method by which it acquires jurisdic-
tion over him. This doctrine originated in Ker v.
Illinois2 and was affirmed in Frisbie v. Collins3 and
has come to be known as the Ker-Frisbie rule.4
This doctrine of criminal jurisdiction has, how-
ever, been the subject of much criticism, and was
sharply attacked by the Second Circuit in United
States v. Toscanino, 6 where the court found that
continued adherence to the Ker-Frisbie rule no
longer comported with modern notions of due proc-
ess. Other courts have been unwilling to follow this
lead, however, and have continued to hold that a
court will not inquire into the manner in which a
defendant is brought into the jurisdiction. 7 The
'It is a well settled principle of criminal procedure that
after an indictment is returned, a court is powerless to
proceed with the trial unless the defendant is present. The
"right to be present" derives from the ancient common
law, and has been called a right scarcely less important
than the right of trial itself. See generally Diaz v. United
States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912); Lewis v. United States, 146
U.S. 370 (1892).
2119 U.S. 436 (1886).
3342 U.S. 519 (1952).
'For a complete discussion of the rule and its implica-
tions see text accompanying notes 10-16 infra.
'See text accompanying notes 24-33 infra.
6500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
7United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1975)
(forcible return to the United States no bar to prosecution);
United States v. Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975)
(forcible abduction from Venezuela did not deprive defend-
ant of due process nor fourth amendment guarantees);
United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir, 1975)
(withholding jurisdiction not required because of forcible
abduction); United States v. Marzano, 388 F. Supp. 906
Second Circuit itself in United States ex. rel. Lujan
v. Gengler' limited its own Toscanino decision by
holding that jurisdiction should be divested only in
those situations where the kidnapping of a defendant
was accompanied by torture or brutality. Neverthe-
less, Toscanino has opened the door to a serious
challenge to the Ker-Frisbie rule.
This Comment will consider the question of
whether a defendant's right to due process is
infringed upon when he is kidnapped and forcibly
removed to ajurisdiction whose law he has allegedly
violated. 9 It will be demonstrated that continued
adherence to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine does not
conform to modern notions of pre-trial due process as
they have been formulated in response to unlawful
conduct by law enforcement officials. Also, as a
matter of policy, it will be shown that continued
adherence to such a rule neither enhances respect for
the law, nor promotes the integrity of the judicial
process.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The technique of abduction to obtain jurisdiction
over a criminal defendant received its initial impetus
from the United States Supreme Court in Ker v.
Illinois. 1o In Ker, the defendant, a resident of Peru,
was indicted by an Illinois grand jury for larceny
and embezzlement. The Governor of Illinois
requested the President to invoke the treaty of
extradition then existing between the United States
(E.D. Ill. 1975) (extradition treaty violation not sufficient
grounds to withhold jurisdiction).
'510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001
(1975).
'This type of lawless conduct can occur in both the
domestic and international setting. One state could abduct
the defendant and bring him into the jurisdiction so that the
criminal proceeding may be commenced against the defend-
ant in that state. Similarly, state or federal agents might
unlawfully abduct a defendant from a foreign country. In
either case due process considerations of the federal Consti-
tution are involved.
10119 U.S. 436 (1886).
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and Peru. 1 The President complied with this
request and issued a warrant which authorized a
Pinkerton agent to take custody of Ker from authori-
ties in Peru. The agent never served the warrant, nor
did he request Peruvian authorities to surrender the
defendant to him. 12 Instead, he forcibly abducted
Ker and placed him aboard an American vessel. Ker
was then taken to Illinois and tried and convicted
there. On appeal, Ker argued that his irregular
arrest, which did not comply with the extradition
treaty between the United States and Peru, denied
him his constitutional right to due process. The
Court rejected that argument, holding that the abduc-
tion of Ker did not violate the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, which at that time had
been part of the Constitution for less than twenty
years. The Court stated that the fourteenth amend-
ment guarantee of due process was satisfied when a
party was regularly indicted and brought to trial
"according to the forms and modes prescribed for
such trials ... ." 13 It was held, therefore, that Ker
could be tried by Illinois regardless of the methods
by which personal jurisdiction over him had been
obtained.
The Supreme Court again faced this question in
Frisbie v,. Collins. 14 A Michigan state prisoner peti-
"Jurisdiction over a fugitive from justice is normally and
legally secured through an extradition treaty. These treaties
provide for a procedure through which the surrender of a
fugitive from the state or country of refuge to the forum can
be accomplished. The practice of extradition has been
developed to remedy the inability of a state to otherwise
lawfully procure the return of a person who has committed
or been convicted of a crime within its territory and
thereafter fled to another jurisdiction. Under United States
law, an extradition request will not be honored unless the
United States has entered into a treaty with the requesting
state. See Valentine v. United States ex. rel. Neidecker, 299
U.S. 5 (1936). The United States presently has over eighty
bilateral extradition treaties in force. A compilation of these
treaties can be found in 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1970). An
extradition treaty entered into by the United States typi-
cally lists a set of offenses; it is agreed that the two countries
will extradite to each other persons charged with or
convicted of those offenses committed within the territory of
the requesting state.
Interstate surrender of fugitives is commonly referred
to as rendition. Forty-seven of the fifty states have adopted
the UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT, 11 UNIFORM
LAws ANN. 51 (1974).
"The failure of the agent to serve the warrant may be
explained in part by the fact that by the time he arrived in
Peru, armed forces of Chile had taken control of Lima as a
result of a war between the two countries. For a complete
discussion of the facts surrounding the Ker abduction see
Comment, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 Ahi. J.
INT'L L. 678 (1953).
12119 U.S. at 440.
14342 U.S. 519 (1952).
tioned for habeas corpus alleging that he had been
forcibly abducted from Illinois to Michigan by
Michigan police officers. The prisoner complained
that he had been kidnapped, handcuffed, and black-
jacked in Chicago by the Michigan law enforcement
officers. He claimed that his subsequent conviction in
Michigan violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment and the Federal Kidnapping
Act, 1 and therefore should be declared null and void.
The Supreme Court rejected his claims, holding that
the Ker principle was still valid and that the
power of a court to try a person for crime is not
diminished because he was brought within the
court's jurisdiction by a forcible abduction. The
Court stated that "due process of law is satisfied
when one present in court is convicted of crime after
being fairly apprised of charges against him and after
a fair trial in accordance with constitutional proce-
dural safeguards.""6
These two cases form the mainstay of the doctrine
that has come to be known as the Ker-Frisbie rule.
"At that time the Federal Kidnapping Act provided:
(a) Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or
foreign commerce, any person who has been unlaw-
fully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kid-
napped, abducted, or carried away and held for
ransom, reward or otherwise, except, in the case of a
minor by a parent thereof, shall be punished (1) by
death if the kidnapped person has not been liberated
unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so
recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of
years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1201 (a), 62 Stat. 760 (now
18 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. IV, 1974)).
In considering this contention the court stated: "This Act
prescribes in detail the severe sanctions Congress wanted it
to have.... We think the Act cannot fairly be construed so
as to add to the list of sanctions detailed a sanction barring a
state from prosecuting persons wrongfully brought to it by
its officers." 342 U.S. at 522-23 (footnote omitted).
16342 U.S. at 522. Strangely, the Court was unanimous
in this conclusion despite the fact that two months earlier
the Court held in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952), that a similar type of pre-trial misconduct consti-
tuted a violation of due process. In Rochin the Supreme
Court unanimously reversed a narcotics conviction because
it was obtained by conduct which "shocks the conscience."
Id. at 172. Police officers, upon seeing the defendant swal-
low two capsules, took him to a hospital where an emetic
solution was poured into the defendant's stomach. The
solution caused him to vomit the capsules which were later
admitted into evidence against him. In reversing the con-
viction, the Court used the due process clause to strike
down a state law enforcement procedure which created no
danger of wrongful conviction, but which involved methods
that were brutal and offensive to the community sense of
fair play and decency. See Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction of a
State Over a Defendant Based Upon Presence Secured by
Force or Fraud, 37 MINN. L. REv. 91, 97-98 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as Scott].
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The Court clearly held that due process was limited
to the guarantee of a constitutionally fair trial,
regardless of the unlawful methods used to obtain
jurisdiction over the defendant. 1 7 It is apparent,
however, that since the Frisbie decision the Supreme
Court has greatly expanded the interpretation of the
due process clause so that it is no longer limited to the
guarantee of fair procedure at trial. 18 In an attempt
to deter police misconduct, the Court has extended
the due process concept to bar the government from
realizing the fruits of its own deliberate and unneces-
sary lawlessness in bringing an accused to trial. In
the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio, "g the Supreme
Court overruled Wolf v. Colorado20 and held that
due process required that the exclusionary rule be
applied in state prosecutions, just at it had for years
been binding on the federal courts. 21 Thus, if state
law enforcement officials obtain evidence through
an illegal search or seizure, such evidence, as a
matter of due process, cannot be admitted in the sub-
sequent trial of the person from whom it was unlaw-
fully seized. In Wong Sun v. United States22 the
Supreme Court held that due process demanded the
exclusion of verbal statements made by a defendant
immediately after an unlawful entry and unauthor-
ized arrest by law enforcement officials. Thus, the
Supreme Court recognized the need to expand the
"It would seem that this holding was broader than
prior case law warranted. Prior to Frisbie, the Court had
dealt with several issues involving pre-trial procedure. In
addition to Rochin, the Court had held that in a state crim-
inal trial confessions obtained by police coercion must be
excluded from evidence, whether such coercion was physical
or psychological. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49
(1949). Also, in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435
(1932), the Court held that when the intent to commit a
crime is planted in the mind of the defendant by the police,
so that he may later be prosecuted, the defendant may in-
voke the defense of entrapment.
"
8This expansion has been described as a constitutional
revolution by one commentator. See Griswold, The Due
Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA.L. REV.
711 (1971).
1-367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Mapp, Cleveland police
officers, suspecting that a criminal was hiding in a certain
house, broke down the door, manhandled a woman resi-
dent, searched the premises, and discovered some obscene
materials in a trunk. The woman was convicted of
possession of these materials. The state court pointed out
that the seized objects had not been taken from the
defendant's person by brutal or offensive force (as in
Rochin),, and thus permitted their use in evidence. The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction.
20338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled, Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
21Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
22371 U.S. 471 (1963).
concept of pre-trial due process in order to deter
official disregard for constitutional prohobitions .
2 3
Concurrent with these developments, several
courts began to question the continued validity of the
Ker-Frisbie rule. This criticism, however, was
passive, demonstrating the unwillingness of courts to
engage in a serious consideration of the constitutional
implications of abduction to obtain jurisdictio... In
United States v. Cotten,2 4 for example, the Ninth
Circuit was asked to hold that the conduct of
government officials in returning the defendants to
Hawaii from the Republic of Viet Nam was so
blatantly violative of their constitutional rights as to
deprive the lower court of jurisdiction . 25 The argu-
ment of the defendants was based on the concept of
fundamental fairness as embodied in the due process
standard of both the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments. The court refused to hold that the lower court
was without jurisdiction, basing its conclusion upon
"old and well-established authority."
The Supreme Court has not since abandoned the Ker
principle, and it has been widely re-asserted, though
at times critically, by the circuits. The fact that it was
state court jurisdiction that was questioned in the
early cases which established the rule is unimportant.
The protection sought in the cases enunciating the
principle was that of the Federal Constitution. The
Supreme Court found that none was afforded then; we
are unable to find any now.
26
25See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
(bugging of a public telephone booth, even without physical
penetration, constituted an unreasonable search and seizure
where no prior judicial approval secured); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (suspects must be informed of
their right to remain silent and to see counsel prior to police
interrogation); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961) ("spike mike" projecting into a house amounted to
an unauthorized physical penetration of a constitutionally
protected area).
2'471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 936
(1973).
5 The defendants were convicted of theft of government
property. They had been arrested by Vietnamese officials
for minor local offenses, and were then delivered to United
States officials who forcibly returned them to Hawaii.
26471 F.2d at 748 (footnotes omitted). The court
considered and summarily rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that the expanded scope of protection given to accused
persons under the fifth and fourteenth amendments preclud-
ed the assumption of jurisdiction by the district court. It
should be noted that the court may have been influenced by
the fact that the United States did not have an extradition
treaty with the Republic of Viet Nam. Nevertheless, as the
court recognized, the United States Department of State
had instituted proceedings to revoke the defendants' pass-
ports and to arrange for their deportation to the United
States prior to their kidnapping and forcible removal. Thus,
it was unnecessary to engage in lawless activity to bring the
defendants within the jurisdiction of the court.
The court did recognize that the soundness of the
doctrine it followed was suspect. Nevertheless, it
refused to strike it down, arguing that "recent
legislation and constitutional protections enunciated
in the last decade provide viable alternative means of
coping with undisciplined law enforcement activi-
ties.""'
In Virgin Islands v. Ortiz2 8 the Third Circuit
also expressed discontent with the Ker-Frisbie rule
pointing out "that the validity of the Frisbie doctrine
has been seriously questioned because it condones
illegal police conduct." "9The court did not, however,
uphold the defendant's contention that his constitu-
tional rights were violated due to his extralegal
transfer into the jurisdiction of the district court."
In United States v. Edmonds, " the Second Circuit
foreshadowed its direct attack on the Ker-Frisbie
rule in Toscanino. The defendants in Edmonds
contended that their arrests were both brutal and
illegal and that the district court should not have
been allowed to proceed against them. 2 The
prosecution argued that, although patently illegal,
the conduct of the police was insufficient to reverse
the convictions, relying by analogy on Frisbie. The
court responded with an enlightened view of the
Ker-Frisbie rule:
We do not find Frisbie... and... Ker... to be a
truly persuasive analogy. These cases were decided
before the Fourth Amendment as such was held ap-
plicable to the states, Mapp v. Ohio.... and thus
"Id. at 748 n. 11. The court was undoubtedly referring
to a civil suit for damage under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
See note 98 infra.
28427 F.2d 1043 (3d Cir. 1970).291d. at 1045 n.2. In support of its statement the court
cited Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures:
Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 16 (1953); Pitler, "The
Fruit of the Poisonous Tzee"Revisited and Shepardized, 56
CALIF. L. Rexv. 579 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Pitler]; The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 66
HARV. L. REv. 89, 127 (1953).
"
5The defendant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
on the ground that his arrest in Puerto Rico and subsequent
return to the Virgin Islands were illegal. Two Virgin Island
detectives had removed Ortiz from a Puerto Rican jail and
took him to the Virgin Islands without a warrant or
extradition or removal proceedings of any kind.
31432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970). The defendants were
arrested for inadvertent failure to have Selective Service
cards in their possession. This was merely a pretext,
however, since the true motivation for the arrests was the
hope that FBI agents who had been attacked the preceeding
evening might be able to identify the arrestees as their
assailants. The court held that the arrest afforded no lawful
basis for procuring evidence with respect to the entirely
different offenses for which the defendants were subse-
quently convicted.3121d. at 582.
rested only on general considerations of due proc-
ess .... Whether the Court would now adhere to
them must be regarded as questionable.
3 3
Despite these periodic expressions of dissatisfac-
tion with the Ker-Frisbie rule, courts have continued
to apply the doctrine, refusing to examine the legality
of the method by which jurisdiction over a defendant
has been obtained. The Supreme Court has never
abandoned the principle, 3 ' and it has been widely
reasserted by the circuits." 5 State courts have simi-
larly shown an unwillingness to divest themselves
of jurisdiction where illegal methods were used to
bring the defendant within the power of the court. 6
3
31d. at 583 (footnote and citations omitted).34 In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), Florida
prisoners claimed a constitutional right to ajudicial hearing
on the issue of probable cause as a prerequisite to an
extended restraint of liberty following arrest. The Court
held that a judicial determination was mandatory under the
fourth amendment, and that the prosecutor's assessment of
probable cause did not alone meet constitutional require-
ments. In holding the prosecutor's assessment of probable
cause insufficient, the Court, citing Ker and Frisbie, stated:
Nor do we retreat from the established rule that illegal
arrest or detention does not void a subsequent convic-
tion .... a suspect who is presently detained may
challenge the probable cause for that confinement,
[but] a conviction will not be vacated
on the ground that the defendant was detained
pending trial without a determination of probable
cause.
420 U.S. at 119. The Court, however, was not confronted
with a situation of forcible abduction to obtain jurisdiction.
The Court's reference to Ker and Frisbie should not be
construed as foreclosing further consideration into the
question of whether the divestiture of jurisdiction is proper
to deter the lawless conduct of law enforcement officials.
35See note 6 supra. See also United States v. Caramian,
468 F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Hamilton,
460 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel.
Calhoun v. Twomey, 454 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1971); Bacon
v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971); Hobson v.
Crouse, 332 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1964); Devine v. Hand,
287 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1961); Strand v. Schmittroth, 251
F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1957); petition for cert. dismissed, 355
U.S. 866 (1958); United States ex rel. Langer v. Ragen,
237 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1956); Wentz v. United States, 244
F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 806
(1957); Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949); Sheehan v. Huff,
142 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1944).
3
6See, e.g., State v. Stone, 294 A.2d 683 (Me. 1972). At
one time Kansas and Nebraska held that it would be against
public policy for the state to sanction unlawful police
behavior by allowing the trial of a defendant whose
presence was secured by kidnapping. In re Robinson, 29
Neb. 135, 45 N.W. 267 (1890); State v. Simmons, 39 Kan.
262, 18 P. 177 (1888). These cases have since been
repudiated. See Foster v. Hudspeth, 170 Kan. 338, 224
P.2d 987 (1950), petition for cert. dismissed, 340 U.S. 940
(1951); Jackson v. Olson, 146 Neb. 885, 22 N.W. 2d 124
(1946).
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In light of the widespread criticism"7 of the
doctrine and the modern evolution of pre-trial due
process, it is somewhat surprising that courts stead-
fastly repeat the rule without a more serious consid-
eration of its constitutional implications. As one
commentator has stated, "[I ]t seems that the courts
have simply fallen into the habit of repeating,
parrot-like, that a court does not care how a
defendant comes before the court, without thinking
whether such a rule is sound on principle."' 38 Upon
analysis it becomes apparent that the Ker-Frisbie
rule is incongruous with the expanded notions of due
process enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court in cases such as Mapp v. Ohio39and Wong Sun
v. United States. o In order to deter the unconstitu-
tional conduct of law enforcement officials, the Court
found it necessary to hold that due process required
the exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of an
illegal search and seizure. Similar considerations are
present when law enforcement officers forego legal
means to obtain jurisdiction over a criminal defend-
ant. A court, by allowing a defendant to be tried after
he has been kidnapped and forcibly brought into
jurisdiction, is giving the government the right to
exploit its own illegal actions. In United States v.
Toscanino 1 these considerations were finally recog-
nized and applied. The decision is significant and
could have far reaching implications concerning the
continued vitality of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.
TOSCANINO AND BEYOND: A QUALIFIED ATTACK
Francisco Toscanino, an Italian citizen, was
convicted in federal court for the Eastern District
of New York of conspiracy to import and deliver
narcotics into the United States. On appeal, the
defendant did not question the sufficiency of the
evidence against him nor did he claim any error with
respect to the conduct of the trial. His major
argument was that the district court proceedings
against him were void, since personal jurisdiction
over him had been illegally obtained."' In support of
37See note 29 supra.
"
8Scott, supra note 16, at 107.39367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10371 U.S. 471 (1963).
41500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
42Id. at 269. As a subsidiary issue, Toscanino also
alleged that prior to his forcible abduction he had been
subjected to electronic surveillance in Uruguay, and that
information obtained thereby had been used by the prosecu-
tion to convict him. He offered to prove that American
officials bribed a telephone company employee in Monte-
video, where the defendant resided, to subject him to
surveillance. According to Toscanino, this employee was
subsequently indicted and imprisoned in Uruguay for
illegal eavesdropping. Toscanino moved pursuant to 18
this allegation Toscanino offered to prove a bizzare
set of circumstances surrounding his kidnapping and
transfer to the jurisdiction of the district court. He
claimed that he had been kidnapped from his home
in Montevideo, Uruguay, by paid American agents 4
and forcibly transported to Brazil where his captors
held him for interrogation prior to sending him on to
New York. While held captive in Brazil, for seven-
teen days, Toscanino was incessantly tortured and
interrogated. 44 During this entire period the
United States Attorney prosecuting the case was
aware of the interrogation and did in fact receive
progress reports.45 Also during this period a mem-
ber of the United States Department of Justice Bu-
reau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs was pres-
sent periodically and participated in portions of the
interrogation. After the period of interrogation the
defendant was drugged and placed on a flight to the
United States, where he was subsequently arrested.
The trial court, relying on the Ker-Frisbie rule,
held that its jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant was not affected by the illegal manner in
which Toscanino was brought into the territory of
the United States. The Second Circuit, however,
refused to take such a sterile view of jurisdiction over
the criminal defendant, and held that the district
court should have dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction if the defendant could have substantiated
his allegations of kidnapping and forcible removal to
the United States. As one basis for this holding, the
court reasoned that due process of law is no longer
U.S.C. § 3504 (1970) to compel the government to affirm
or deny whether he had been subjected to surveillance. The
court held his allegations sufficient to require the govern-
ment to respond to the query. Id. at 270-271.
"Id. at 269. He was seized by a local police officer of
Montevideo whom the court characterized as "acting ultra
vires in that he was the paid agent of the United States
government." Id. The defendant also alleged that the
government of Uruguay did not know of or consent to the
kidnapping. Id. at 270.
"The defendant was denied sleep and all forms of
nourishment for days at a time. Toscanino claimed that he
was forced to walk up and down a hallway for seven or
eight hours at a time. He was also kicked, beaten, and
pinched with metal pliers. Agents flushed alcohol into his
eyes and nose, forced other fluids into his anal passage, and
attached electrodes to his earlobes, toes and genitals. All of
this torture was administered in such a manner as to punish
without scarring. Id. at 270.
"At no time, however, had the United States made any
request of the government of Uruguay for the extradition of
Toscanino. The defendant argued that "from start to finish
the government unlawfully, willingly, and deliberately
embarked upon a brazenly criminal scheme violating the
laws of three separate countries." Id. at 270.
satisfied only by a fair trial in accordance with
constitutional procedural safeguards, as Frisbie
declared, but rather the guarantee of due process
extends to the pre-trial conduct of law enforcement
authorities as well. 46 The court found that the
Ker-Frisbie rule was irreconcilable with the
Supreme Court's expansion of the concept of due
process, as evidenced initially by Rochin4 and later
by Mapp," where the court found it necessary to
"protect the accused against pretrial illegality by
denying to the government the fruits of its exploita-
tion of any deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness on
its part.""
The court noted that it was faced with a conflict
between two concepts of due process, one being the
restricted version found in Ker-Frisbie and the other
an enlightened interpretation expressed in more
recent decisions of the Supreme Court. 50 The court,
making a dramatic break with the weight of prior
case law, found that the restrictive Ker-Frisbie
version must yield. For the Toscanino court, due
process now required a court to decline personal
jiurisdiction over a defendant where such jurisdiction
"has been acquired as the result of the government's
deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of
the accused's constitutional rights." "The defendant,
having been unlawfully seized in violation of the
'1Id. at 274.
4 See note 16 supra.
48367 U.S. at 657-60.
49500 F.2d at 275.
"See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
51500 F.2d at 275. The court viewed this conclusion as
an extension of the power of the federal courts in a civil case
to refuse to assume jurisdiction over a defendant whose
presence was secured by force or fraud. See, e.g., In re
Johnson, 167 U.S. 120 (1897); Fitzgerald Construction Co.
v. Fitzgerald, 137 U.S. 98 (1890); Wyman v. Newhouse, 93
F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 664 (1938).
Whereas the rule in civil cases appears to be discretionary,
the policy behind the rule is applicable to the forcible
abduction of a criminal defendant. In the civil case the
plaintiff who uses force or fraud to obtain jurisdiction over
the defendant is himself guilty of a wrong, and thus the
court refuses to allow him to profit from his actions. In State
v. Ross, 21 Iowa 467 (1866), it was held that this reasoning
should not be extended to criminal cases because when a
defendant is forcibly abducted the people are guilty of no
wrong; only the law enforcement officials have broken the
law. One commentator has argued that "the better view is
that the state is a single entity ..... What the police do in
the line of duty should be deemed done by the state as well
as for the state." Scott, supra note 16, at 104-05. Thus, it
may be argued that a state that prosecutes a criminal
defendant should be barred from realizing the fruits of
the unlawful conduct of its law enforcement officials.
fourth amendment, 52 should as a matter of funda-
mental fairness be returned by the government to his
status quo ante. "
The Toscanino court also relied on two alternative
bases to support its decision. First, the court pointed
out that it could rely simply upon its supervisory
power over the proper administration of criminal
justice in the district courts within its jurisdiction.51
This power could be used here to prevent the
criminal process of a federal district court from being
abused or degraded where it is enforced against a
defendant who was brought before the court in the
manner alleged by Toscanino. It was necessary, the
court stated, "to prevent district courts from them-
selves becoming 'accomplices in the willful disobedi-
ence of the law.'"
5 5
Second, the most innovative argument of the court
was that jurisdiction should be declined in a case that
involves the abduction of a defendant in violation of
an international treaty of the United States. 56 This
52The fourth amendment guarantees the right of people
to be secure in their persons against unreasonable seizures.
U.S. CoNsa. amend. IV. The Toscanino court found the
defendant's constitutional rights violated, relying on the
principle that an illegal arrest constitutes a seizure of the
person in violation of the fourth amendment. See Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-01 (1959); Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958) (an illegal arrest per se
violates the Constitution); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10 (1948).
51500 F.2d at 275. The court did not discuss the
practical or theoretical problems involved in the "status quo
ante" concept. Presumably, the court meant that the
defendant would be returned to the jurisdiction from which
he was unlawfully removed. Once returned to his status quo
ante, it would seem that the defendant could not be
subjected to the government's legal attempts to obtain
jurisdiction over him with respect to the crime for which he
was originally abducted. Thus, the divestiture of jurisdic-
tion should be permanent in order to meet the objective of
deterring the unlawful conduct of law enforcement officials.
In a similar vein, once it has been determined that
jurisdiction must be divested due to the failure of law
enforcement officers to lawfully bring the defendant before
the court, then it follows that the defendant should be
returned to his status quo ante prior to being indicted for
other crimes within that or another jurisdiction.
54Id. at 276. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943); United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir.
1972).
11500 F.2d at 276, quoting McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943).
"
6Id. at 277. An extradition treaty did exist between the
United States and Uruguay at the time of Toscanino's
abduction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1970). It was therefore
unnecessary for government agents to engage in lawless
conduct, for a special arrangement could have been made
with the government of Uruguay for Toscanino's extradi-
tion.
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point clearly distinguished Ker and Frisbie from the
situation before the court, since neither case rested on
the violation of an international treaty.5 In addition
to violating the extradition treaty with Uruguay, the
alleged conduct of the government was also a viola-
tion of the Charter of the United Nations and the
Charter of the Organization of Americah States."
The court found the controlling rule in Cook v.
United States, 9 which it read as holding that an
American court should not try a criminal defendant
whose presence has been secured by means of a treaty
violation. The Toscanino court did not specifically
mention due process considerations in its discussions
of the treaty violations, but it is arguable that this
second alternative holding is but a manifestation of
the court's prior assertion that the Ker-Frisbie rule
has been drastically weakened by Mapp and Rochin.
The policy of deterring official lawlessness, very
much a part of those two decisions, 61 may be present
in the court's unwillingness to sanction the assump-
tion of jurisdiction over a defendant when his
presence has been secured in violation of an interna-
tional treaty.
The Toscanino decision, standing alone, appeared
to be a very important step in the breakdown of a
traditional rule. Many questions were left unan-
swered, however, and it was not until United States
ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler6 1 that the scope of the
Toscanino decision was delineated. Lujan, an
5
"Frisbie involved an alleged interstate abduction. The
Supreme Court in Ker held that the extradition treaty
between the United States and Peru did not apply and
would have been violated by the United States only if, after
receiving the fugitive, it attempted to try him for a crime
other than the one for which he was surrendered. See
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
58500 F.2d at 277. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4
(an agreement that all members, which included the United
States and Uruguay, must "refrain... from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity of political
independence of any state"); O.A.S. CHARTER art. 17
(provides that the "territory of a state is inviolable; it may
not be the object even temporarily,.., of... measures of
force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, or any
grounds whatever").
59288 U.S. 102 (1933). In Cook the United States Coast
Guard seized a British vessel in violation of territorial limits
fixed by treaty. The Supreme Court held that the govern-
ment lacked power to seize the vessel, since it had, through
the treaty, voluntarily imposed a territorial limitation upon
its own authority. Thus, a subsequent libel for forfeiture of
the vessel was properly dismissed by the federal district
court, notwithstanding the vessel's physical presence within
the jurisdiction.
"
0See text accompanying notes 87-99 infra.
61510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001
(1975).
Argentine citizen, was indicted in New York for
conspiracy to import and distribut heroin. An
arrest warrant was issued for the defendant, but,
as the court pointed out, it was enforced in a very
unconventional manner. 6" Lujan alleged that he was
lured into Bolivia by a paid American agent who
hired Lujan to fly him there. Bolivian police, also
acting as paid agents of the United States, arrested
Lujan upon arrival and held him incommunicado for
six days. He was then placed on a plane bound for
New York, and was arrested upon arrival there. 3
Lujan did not allege any acts of torture, terror, or
custodial interrogation, nor did he assert that the
United States Attorney was aware of his abduction or
of any interrogation. 64 The court seized upon these
points and thus distinguished Toscanino, limiting it
to cases that demonstrated egregious situations
involving torture, brutality, or similar outrageous
conduct. The Lujan court made it clear that Tos-
canino did not completely abandon the Ker-Frisbie
rule; it only recognized that government agents no
longer had a free reign in bringing defendants into a
jurisdiction. Thus, Lugan represents a retreat to
the traditional concepts which the Toscanino court
had made a strong effort to eviscerate.
The Lujan court also addressed itself to the
allegation that since the abduction violated the
Charters of the United Nations and the Organization
of American States, 65 Tuscanino was applicable and
therefore jurisdiction should be declined. The court
held, however, that Lujan's failure to allege that
either Argentina or Bolivia in any way protested or
objected to his abduction was fatal to his argument .6
The court said that the charter provisions were
designed to protect the sovereignty of states, and
therefore the offended state must initially lodge an
objection or require redress. 67 Individual rights are
derivative through the states in this regard, and if a
state does not object to a violation of its sovereignty,
then the individual abducted therefrom has no
grounds on which to allege a violation of interna-
tional law. 68
62471 F.2d at 63.
6 At no time had he been charged by Bolivian police, nor
had the United States made any extradition request.
64510 F.2d at 66.
6$See note 46 supra.
"6Toscanino specifically alleged that the Uruguayan
government claimed that it had no prior knowledge of his
kidnapping, and that it in fact condemned such apprehen-
sion as alien to its laws. 500 F.2d at 270.
"7'510 F.2d at 67.681d. Illustrative of the operation of this principle is the
Adolf Eichmann case. Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36
The Lujan court thus severely limited the argu-
ments available to a defendant who has been the
subject of an international kidnapping by law
enforcement agents. It is arguable, however, that
whether or not the state of the defendant's refuge
objects, the government's abduction of a person who
is under the protection of the laws of that nation
violates that nation's sovereignty." The United
States has agreed to respect the sovereignty of
Uruguay and Bolivia, 70 but by foregoing legal
process and engaging in clandestine efforts to abduct
criminal defendants, it breached that agreement. The
answer to whether the defendant can use such a
breach to his advantage in a subsequent criminal
proceeding depends more upon the attitude which
one takes towards official lawlessness, rather than
upon the objection of the offended nation. If notions
of modern due process are as expansive as the
Toscanino court seemed to indicate, then a defendant
should have the opportunity to rely upon an interna-
tional treaty violation in an attempt to demonstrate
why a court should divest itself of jurisdiction.7
Lujan, however, restricts this opportunity.
Strong policy considerations are also present in the
context of an abduction from an objecting country or
in violation of a treaty. Those considerations are (1)
respect for the law of nations; (2) the requirements of
world society; and (3) the integrity and independence
of other nations. 72 The last should be observed not
I.L.R. 18 (Dist. Ct. Israel 1961), aff'd, 36 I.L.R. 277
(1962). Adolf Eichmann was a Nazi war criminal who had
been kidnapped in Argentina, allegedly by agents of the
Israeli government, and forcibly brought to Israel to stand
trial. Eichmann argued that his abduction from a foreign
country was a breach of international law, and therefore the
court was without jurisdiction over him. Argentina lodged a
complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations
prior to the trial. Subsequent to this complaint, the two
countries issued a joint communique resolving "to regard as
closed the incident which arose out of the action taken by
citizens of Israel, which infringed the fundamental rights of
the State of Argentina." 36 I.L.R. at 59. The Israeli court
held that since the matter was closed, Eichmann could not
benefit from the breach of international law by obtaining
dismissal of the case. The court relied, inter alia, upon the
Ker-Frisbie precedent. 36 I.L.R. at 69-71.
"gSee Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State
Over Fugitives Brought From a Foreign Country by Force
or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 IND. L.J. 427 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as Garcia-Mora]; Preuss,
Kidnapping of Fugitives from Justice on Foreign Territory,
29 Asi. J. INT'L. L. 502 (1935).
71See note 58 supra.
71500 F.2d at 272, 277.
7"United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Oakes, J., concurring). See also Bassiouni, Unlawful
Seizures and Irregular Rendition Devices as Alternatives to
only because of formal charters entered into between
nations, but also as unwritten obligations of interna-
tional law. " Respecting the sovereignty and integrity
of other nations increases the ability of the United
States to demand similar respect for its own sover-
eign integrity. This pragmatic view, buttressed by
the aforementioned policy considerations, further
justifies the divestiture of jurisdiction over a defend-
ant who has been illegally abducted from a foreign
state of refuge.
The Second Circuit had one further opportunity in
United States v. Lira " to strengthen the Toscanino
rationale, but instead the court employed another
restrictive interpretation and found that Toscanino
did not control. The defendant appealed from a
narcotics conviction alleging that he had been il-
legelly abducted from Chile and tortured by agents
of the United States government, and that under
these circumstances dismissal of the case was man-
dated by Toscanino. The defendant testified that
he was arrested by Chilean police officers and sub-
sequently tortured by them, during which time he
heard English being spoken in a low tone by several
persons present. " An agent of the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration, who was in Chile at the time of
these occurrences, testified that the defendant had
been arrested at the request of the D.E.A. and that
the United States government had requested an
expulsion order. " The agent denied that he had ever
met the defendant before he boarded the plane in
Santiago, or that he or another D.E.A. representa-
Extradition, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 25 (1973),
where the author points out that "[a]side
from the flagrant violation of the individual's human rights,
these practices [e.g., abductions] affect the
stability of international relations and subvert the interna-
tional legal process." Id. at 27.
73See Garcia-Mora, supra note 69.
7-515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975). Judges Mansfield and
Oakes participated on both the Toscanino and Lira panels.
71d. at 69. After being held at the local police station for
four days, the defendant was then transferred to a prison
where he was held for three weeks. During the latter time
period he was beaten and tortured. Further interrogation
took place in the Chilean Prosecutor's Office. The defend-
ant saw two agents of the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration in the building, but they did not participate
in any interrogations.
7"The extradition treaty between the United States and
Chile provided that Chilean nationals, which the defendant
was, could not be extradited to the United States. An
expulsion order is normally issued when a country desires
to deport an alien from its territory. Lira was not an alien to
Chile, but nevertheless that country chose to expel its own
national at the request of the United States. See generally 2
D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 792-801 (1965).
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tive in Chile had received any reports from Chilean
police concerning the defendant after his arrest. The
agent also testified that the D.E.A. was not involved
with the investigation conducted by Chilean police. "
The court held that Toscanino did not apply in
this situation, since there was no direct evidence to
suggest that the gross mistreatment leading to the
forcible abduction of the defendant was perpetrated
by representatives of the United States government.
The evidence adduced showed a suspicion of United
States involvement in the Chilean police actions,"
but not that the United States participated or
acquiesced in the alleged misconduct of Chilean
officials. 7 With no substantial evidence that the
Chilean police were acting as agents of the United
States in mistreating and abducting the defendant,
the court felt constrained to affirm the judgment
rendered by the district court. "
Restricted by a outmoded rule, yet desirous of
implementing a modern analysis, the Second Circuit
has managed to make headway in attempting to
formulate a workable doctrine applicable to the
forcible return of a defendant to a jurisdiction.
The holding of Toscanino, even though limited by
Lujan and Lira to egregious cases involving torture
and brutality toward a defendant by law enforce-
77515 F.2d at 70.
"
8This suspicion would seem to have a firmer basis than
the court was willing to recognize. Chilean officials were
most cooperative in honoring the D.E.A.'s requests, and
even provided a large Chilean escort for the return trip to
the United States. It also appears that Chilean law was
clearly violated when the Chilean government issued an
expulsion decree ordering that the defendant be sent to the
United States. See note 76 supra.
Judge Oakes, recognizing these suspicions, pointed out
in a concurring opinion:
While I concur in the result, I find the case more
troublesome perhaps than does the majority. Having
sat on Toscanino and Lujan panels and now on this
case, I agree that this case falls-just barely-on the
Lujan rather than the Toscanino side of the line.
515 F.2d at 72 (Oakes, J., concurring).
"'While United States involvement was questionable, it
seems clear that if the mistreatment of the defendant was
perpetrated solely by foreign law enforcement officials, after
which the United States lawfully obtains custody of the
fugitive, the defendant has no grounds to object. The Lira
court stated: "The D.E.A. can hardly be expected to
monitor the conduct of representatives of each foreign
government to assure that a request for extradition or
expulsion is carried out in accordance with American
constitutional standards." 515 F. 2d at 71.
"°The court also rejected the defendant's arguments that
the United States government was vicariously responsible
for his torture, and that the violations by Chilean police of
their domestic law were sufficient grounds to withhold
jurisdiction. 515 F.2d at 71.
ment officials, nevertheless represents a major
break-through in the field of pre-trial criminal due
process. It can be contended, however, that limiting
Toscanino to such circumstances is unwarranted,
and that under modern notions of due process the
divestiture of jurisdiction over a criminal defendant is
necessary to deter forcible abductions in the name of
law enforcement. The door was left open in Lujan
for further consideration:
[Aldoption of an exclusionary rule here would
confer a total immunity to criminal prosecution. More-
over, the controls which otherwise exist to prevent
illegal abductions-the financial cost of the operation,
the possibility of alienating other nations, and the
risk that the kidnappers would be prosecuted in a
foreign territory for their offense-suggest that the
likelihood of numerous violations is not real. If this
assumption should, in the future, prove to be ill-
founded our conclusion can be reconsidered. 81
The assumption is ill-founded; Judge Oakes pointed
out in Lira that the court was told at oral argument
that six more cases of D.E.A. abductions were likely
to come before them. 82 Moreover, it is inadequate to
continue to justify the Ker-Frisbie rule on the
supposition that the likelihood of numerous viola-
tions is not real. If a defendant's due process rights
are violated by the pre-trial conduct of law enforce-
ment authorities, this cannot be justified by the
relative infrequence of such violations. It is time,
therefore, for federal and state courts alike to begin to
examine the mode in which a defendant is brought
before the court, rather than conveniently restating a
rule which upon analysis proves very difficult to
justify. It therefore becomes imperative to examine
this analysis and demonstrate why continued adher-
ence to the Ker-Frisbie approach is no longer
acceptable in light of modern notions of due process.
INFLUENCE OF MODERN ANALYSIS
Toscanino stands for the proposition that if law
enforcement officals, in the course of kidnapping and
forcibly removing a defendant, employ torture or
brutality to effectuate their purpose, then a court
should refuse to assume jurisdiction over the defend-
ant. This principle is based upon a due process
violation of the type recognized in Rochin v. Cali-
fornia, where the Court reversed a conviction
obtained by conduct which "shocks the con-
science." "3 A more difficult case is posed, however,
81510 F.2d at 68 n. 9 (citation omitted).
82515 F.2d at 72.
8-342 U.S. 165 (1952). See note 16 supra.
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where law enforcement authorities simply forego
available legal means to acquire jurisdiction over a
criminal defendant in favor of the quick but lawless
seizure and removal of the defendant into the
jurisdiction of the court. 84 Whether accomplished by
agents of a state or of the federal government, it is
clear that the agents do not have the extraterritorial
power to lawfully accomplish that act. The Supreme
Court in Frisbie was unwilling to hold that official
violation of the law, which in that case was the
Federal Kidnapping Act, mandated a court to decline
jurisdiction over a defendant.5 It is difficult to
reconcile this concept with Mapp 7'. Ohio 8" and its
progeny.
In State v. Stone8" the court was squarely
presented with the argument that in light of Mapp,
state courts could no longer assume jurisdiction over
a defendant whose presence was secured by kidnap-
ping. " Nevertheless, the court found that the validity
of the Ker-Frisbie rule had been unaltered by the
evidence-exclusionary doctrine imposed upon the
states by the United States Supreme Court in
Mapp. 8 While recognizing that the purpose of de-
terring unconstitutional police behavior was a high
priority value in the original formulation of the
Mapp evidence-exclusionary principle, the court
stated that the primary consideration behind that
principle was to protect the integrity of the guilt
adjudication process. This could only be accom-
plished by preventing that process from utilizing
evidence acquired by the unconstitutional behavior
of law enforcement officials, and by preventing
judgments of guilt attributabe in part to such con-
4 A kidnapping and forcible removal of a defendant
ostensibly violates the Federal Kidnapping Act. See note 15
supra. Nothing in Frisbie is to the contrary.
85342 U.S. at 522-23.
86367 U.S. 643 (1961). Toscanino stood squarely for this
proposition prior to its limitation in Lujan.
"7294 A.2d 683 (Me. 1972).88The defendants had been arrested in New Hampshire
and detained there by local authorities. Maine law enforce-
ment officials were then notified and they immediately went
to New Hampshire. The defendants were handcuffed and
physically transported by the Maine officers from New
Hampshire to Maine under the ostensible official authority
asserted by the Maine law enforcement officials. Both
Maine and New Hampshire have adopted, with minor
variations, the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 201-29 (1964); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. ch. 612 (1973).
8 9Prior to Mapp, Maine had declined to follow an
exclusionary rule for evidence that was acquired by fourth
amendment violations. See State v. Schoppe, 113 Me. 10,
92 A. 867 (1915).
duct. "8 Having determined this to be the primary
emphasis of Mapp, the Stone court deduced that
when the unconstitutional behavior of law enforce-
ment officials relates only to the manner in which
a defendant is brought into a jurisdiction, then there
is no direct threat to the integrity of the guilt adju-
dication process. The court went on to state:
While "process of law" might be said to be invol-
ved-if only in the respect that defendants had been
produced within the territorial jurisdiction of a Court
by government officials, acting under the cloak of the
authority of the law-the relationship to the ultimate
deprivation of liberty resulting from defendants' con-
victions of crime is too remote and tenuous to bring
into play a violation of "due process of law" as the
instrumentality to establish a divestment of subject
matter jurisdiction binding upon every court in the
land under the federal Fourteenth Amendment.91
The reasoning employed by the Stone court to
reject the application of Mapp to the concept of
abduction to obtain jurisdiction is fallacious on
several grounds. The court's reasoning necessarily
places primary emphasis upon preventing the con-
tamination of the guilt adjudication process by the
introduction of illegally obtained evidence. This
certainly was an important concern behind the
evidence-exclusionary principle. However, no less a
concern was the prevention of unconstitutional police
behavior in violation of the fourth amendment, and
this concern has received increasing emphasis in
more recent applications of the principle to particu-
lar situations. 92 The Court in Mapp clearly stated
that it could no longer permit the "right to be secure
against rude invasions by state officers" to be
"revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in
the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to
suspend its enjoyment." 93 Thus, deterring unlawful
police activity was clearly an important underpin-
ning of the Mapp doctrine. This was recognized in
United States v.. Russell, 4 where the Court pointed
out that "the principle reason behind the adoption of
the exclusionary rule was the Government's 'failure
to observe its own laws.'" 9'
10294 A.2d at 694.
"
1Id. at 695.
92United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963).
11367 U.S. at 660.
94411 U.S. 423 (1973).
95 1d. at 430. The defendants in Russell were convicted of
illegal manufacture of a controlled substance. The essential
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Moreover. the Stone analysis does not sufficiently
answer the contention that since the fourth amend-
ment guarantees the security of the person as well as
the security of property, an unlawful seizure of the
person by a forcible abduction violates that amend-
ment no less than an unlawful seizure of property. 
96
Since the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence has
been deemed a proper way to deter illicit police
activity, it is not at all clear why the divesting of
jurisdiction over an unlawfully seized defendant
should not also be required. 97 As a practical matter,
the likelihood that a defendant would institute a civil
suit for damages to redress the loss of rights during
the course of an unlawful abduction is rather
remote. " Thus, apparently, law enforcment authori-
ties who ignore lawful means of obtaining jurisdic-
tion over a defendant can profit by their illegal
abduction with no real threat of punishment. Divest-
ing a court of jurisdiction is the only effective way to
deter such undesirable conduct. " In Mapp the only
sanction necessary to deter the unlawful conduct of
ingredient in the formula was supplied by a federal
narcotics agent. The Court did not find this conduct by the
federal agent sufficient to overturn the defendants' convic-
tions, rejecting an analogy to the exclusionary rule. The
Court, however, did not diminish the principle that unlaw-
ful police conduct demands the exclusion of evidence seized
thereby. The majority argued that the conduct of the
government in this case violated no independent constitu-
tional right of the defendant, nor did the government agent
violate any federal statute or rule or commit any crime
while infiltrating the defendant's scheme. Id.
9 See note 40 supra. The fourth amendment guarantees
"[tihe right of the people to be secure in their
persons ... "; an arrest is a seizure of the person. U.S.
CoNsT. amend. IV. See Barrett, Personal Rights, Prop-
erly Rights, and the Fourth Amendement, 1960 S. Cr.
REv. 46, 47; Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seiz-
ures, 34 HARV. L. REv. 361 (1921).
"
TSuch analysis was originally suggested in Pitler, supra
note 29, at 600. The court in Toscanino apparently based
its decision upon this analysis as well.
98A civil suit for damages under § 1983 may be viable in
some abduction situations, but in the absence of brutal or
outrageous conduct, it would be difficult to establish a
violation of rights in a § 1983 suit.
99See Scott, supra note 16, at 101-02. The author
compared the inadequate remedies against offending offi-
cers for abduction to the remedies available for illegal
searches and seizures.
The right to be free from unlawful bodily interference
by police officers is at least as important as the right to
be free from unlawful search and seizure of property
by them; so that the only effective way to deter police
from such lawlessness is to say to them, "We will not
try a criminal whose presence in the state has been
thus secured."
Id.
law enforcement officials was to exclude unconstitu-
tionally seized evidence. As Toscanino points out,
when suppression of evidence does not suffice, as in
the case of a forcible abduction, then the court must
tailor its remedy to insure that an ultimate conviction
will not be had through governmental illegality. '
Furthermore, it is merely an exercise in intellec-
tual dishonesty to hold that the decency and dignity
of the guilt adjudication process is not demeaned
when such process is used against one who is brought
before the court in a lawless manner. The guilt
adjudication process does not operate in a vacuum,
oblivious to conduct that occurs prior to the com-
mencement of the trial. Judicial integrity is certainly
not furthered when a court refuses to concern itself
with the lawless manner in which an accused is
brought before it. It is clear that the "concept of due
process now protects an accused against pretrial
illegality by denying to the government the fruits of
its exploitation of any deliberate and unnecessary
lawlessness on its part." 11 Pre-trial illegality,
whether in the form of an unlawful search and
seizure or a forcible abduction, must be. guarded
against. It is no answer to say that the relationship
between the ultimate conviction of a defendant and
the unlawful method in which he has been brought
before the court is too tenuous to admit of a due
process violation. An accused cannot be convicted
unless he is present before the court. The lawless
conduct involved in obtaining his presence becomes a
vital link to that conviction, and is not merely
remotely related to it.
Thus, as long as Mapp and its progeny continue to
have vitality in the criminal law, 1o2 it becomes very
difficult analytically to adhere to the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine. The distinct possibility exists, however,
that the Supreme Court may modify the eividene-
exclusionary principle in the near future,1° 3 Assum-
ing that the rule is not abolished altogether, it is
likely that the Court may allow law enforcement
officials to interpose a good faith defense, whereby
the rule would only be applicable to intentional or
100500 F.2d at 275.
1011d. at 272.
1 2It is recognized that the principle is not without its
critics. See'Comment, Trends in Legal Commentary on the
Exclusionary Rule, 65 J. CRI,%i. L. & C. 373, "380-84
(1974).
1
03The Court recently heard arguments in two cases
which could potentially result in a decision altering the
exclusionary rule. See Wolff v. Rice, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th
Cir.), cert. granted, 422 U.S. 1055 (1975); Stone v. Powell,
507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 422 U.S. 1055
(1975).
flagrantly illegal police activity. 104 Judge Friendly
has pointed out that it may be inconsistent with "the
objective of deterrence that the maximum penalty of
exclusion should be enforced for an error ofjudgment
by a policeman necessarily formed on the spot and
without a set of the United States Reports in his
hands .... , '0' Even if the application of the
rule is limited to instances of bad faith by law en-
forcement officials, it is arguable that a forcible
abduction to obtain jurisdiction, in lieu of available
legal process, is prima facie bad faith. A forcible
abduction cannot be likened to a slight and uninten-
tional miscalculation by the police, which presum-
ably would be amenable to a good faith defense.
Rather, kidnapping a defendant and forcibly remov-
ing him into the jurisdiction of the court is conduct
that is flagrantly illegal. Thus, even under a modified
exclusionary principle such lawless conduct by law
enforcement officials would still be objectionable. 100
Concededly, abolition of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
would require courts to impose, as a deterrent, a
rather harsh remedy to redress the unlawful activity
of law enforcement officials-the permanent divesti-
ture ofjurisdiction over a particular defendant. As a
matter of policy some courts have argued that such a
remedy is not proper in light of the strong state
interest of enforcing the criminal law by bringing
fugitives to justice. 10' The interests of the individual
offender are clearly antagonistic to those of the state,
and in balancing the two, courts have demonstrated a
definite tendency to hold that pre-trial infringe-
ments upon an accused's rights are outweighed by
the social interest in the suppression of crime. It is
certainly arguable as a practical matter that the ex-
...This modification was suggested in Friendly, The Bil
of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L.
REv. 929 (1965).
'1d. at 952.
'06If, however, there exists no available legal means by
which to effect the transfer of a defendant into the
jurisdiction, then there would seem to be no objection to an
extraterritorial arrest. Any other rule would allow an
offender to completely escape justice due to his choice of
refuge. Under the exclusionary rule analogy, objections to
jurisdiction should be allowed only when law enforcement
officials ignore available legal process and obtain jurisdic-
tion by shortcut methods.
0 The court in Stone clearly reflected this concern when
it stated that the theory propounded by the defendant
"confers upon the objective of deterrence of lawless behav-
ior by law enforcement officials, taken in and of itself, a
value primacy so overwhelming that it demands to be
fulfilled by any sanction reasonably likely to foster it-re-
gardless of the magnitude of injury concomitantly inflicted
upon the public welfare in other respects." 294 A.2d at 694.
elusion of relevant evidence frequently leads to a
wrongdoer escaping conviction entirely. It logically
follows that a denial of jurisdiction over a particular
defendant imposes no greater penalty than would
the exclusion of crucial evidence, while accomplish-
ing the same laudable goal of deterring unlawful
conduct by law enforcement officials. It is undoubt-
edly true, as Justice Cardozo pointed out, that un-
der the constitutional exclusionary doctrine, "[tihe
criminal is to go free because the constable has blun-
dered." 108 The Court in Mapp modified this state-
ment to: "the criminal goes free, if he must, but it
is the law that sets him free." 109
The law sets him free because of a strong counter-
vailing theory to the principle that criminals must be
punished for their unlawful acts: the government is
not above the dictates of the law. By assuming
jurisdiction over a criminal who has been kidnapped
and forcibly abducted in contravention of the fourth
amendment, the Federal Kidnapping Act, 1 10 or an
international treaty, a court rewards the govern-
ment's acts of lawlessness, and diminishes public
respect for the law. "' This policy is certainly a very
important one, but heretofore has not commanded
controlling respect in the consideration of whether a
court should decline jurisdiction when it is has been
obtained by a clear act of lawlessness. A kidnapping
and abduction is merely a shortcut method of law
enforcement, and such methods have been clearly
denounced in the past as a matter of policy. It has
been stated:
We are duly mindful of the reliance that society must
place for achieving law and order upon the enforcing
agencies of the criminal law. But insistence on
observance by law officers of traditional fair proce-
dural requirements is, from the long point of view,
best calculated to contribute to that end. However
much in a particular case insistence upon such rules
may appear as a technicality that inures to the benefit
of a guilty person, the history of the criminal law
proves that tolerance of shortcut methods in law
enforcement impairs its enduring effectweness. 112
... People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 583, 587
(1926).
100367 U.S. at 659.
11018 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. IV, 1974).
"'See Scott, supra note 16.
"
2 United States v. Miller, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958)
(emphasis added). It was held that since the defendant did
not receive prior notice of authority and purpose before an
officer broke down the door to his home, the arrest was
unlawful and the evidence seized should have been sup-
pressed.
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Public respect for the law is certainly not enhanced
when the very people who are charged with enforcing
the law are themselves guilty of serious violations.
The government sets a very poor example when it
obtains convictions as a result of unnecessary lawless
conduct. This conveys the impression that there are
two standards of law under the Constitution, one
standard for the people and another for those
entrusted with law enforcement. One should not
forget the serious admonition of Mr. Justice Bran-
deis' dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United
States: 113
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that
government officials shall be subjected to the same
rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In
a Government of laws, existence of the government
will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law
scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If
the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a
law unto himself; it invites anarchy. 114
These serious considerations go unheeded when a
court cites the Ker-Frisbie rule without giving
thought to whether the policy behind that rule is a
sound one, and whether respect for the law is
seriously diminished. "'
113277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928).
114In this vein Justice Brandeis also stated:
The Court's aid is denied only when he who seeks it
has violated the law in connection with the very
transaction as to which he seeks legal redress. Then
aid is denied despite the defendant's wrong. It is
denied in order to maintain respect for the law; in
order to promote confidence in the administration of
justice; in order to preserve the judicial process from
contamination .... To declare that in the admini-
stration of the criminal law the end justifies the
means-to declare that the Government may com-
mit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a pri-
vate criminal-would bring terrible retribution.
Against that pernicious doctrine this court should
resolutely set its face.
Id. at 484-85 (footnote omitted).
'Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145, 172 (1947), also alluded to the
necessity of maintaining respect for law:
Stooping to questionable methods neither enhances
that respect for law which is the most potent element
in law enforcement, nor, in the long run, do such
methods promote successful prosecution. In this coun-
try police testimony is often rejected by juries precisely
because of a widely entertained belief that illegal
methods are used to secure testimony. Thus, dubious
Federal courts of appeal are in a strong position to
recognize these important policy considerations and
exercise their supervisory powers over the adminis-
tration of criminal justice by refusing to allow the
assumption of jurisdiction over an illegally appre-
hended defendant.'"" This supervisory power, first
expressed in McNabb v. United States, "' is available
to enable federal courts to refuse to countenance
"trials which are the outgrowth of fruit of the
Government's illegality," since they "debase the
process of justice."1 1 8 This clearly reflects the
rationale behind divesting jurisdiction over forcibly
abducted defendants. State courts, although not
equipped with such a convenient supervisory mecha-
nism, should nevertheless recognize that divestiture
of jurisdiction is a necessary means of enhancing
respect for law and deterring lawless conduct by law
enforcement officials.
CONCLUSION
The conflict recognized by the Toscanino court
between the Ker-Frisbie rule and modern notions of
due process19 is a real one that can no longer be
ignored in the administration of criminal justice.
police methods defeat the very ends ofjustice by which
such methods are justified. No such cloud rests on
police testimony in England. Respect for law by law
officers promotes respect generally, just as lawlessness
by law officers sets a contagious and competitive
example to others.
See also Judge L. Hand's opinion for the court in United
States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926).
'This was clearly approved of in Toscanino, where the
court found that the supervisory power was not limited to
the admission or exclusion of evidence, but could be
exercised in any manner necessary to remedy abuses of a
district court's process. 500 F.2d at 276. Cf Rea v. United
States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956). See also United States v. Lira,
515 F. 2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1975) (Oakes, J., concurring).
-1318 U.S. 332 (1943).
118See Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its
Rise, Rationale, and Rescue, 47 Geo. L. J. 1, 29, 32
(1952). To buttress the exercise of this supervisory power to
bar the exercise of jurisdiction over forcibly abducted
defendants, federal courts can also rely upon the mandate in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In that case
the Supreme Court held that evidence illegally procured by
federal officials was barred from use in federal trials. Thus,
even if Mapp is modified, federal courts will still be bound
by Weeks, and can utilize their supervisory power to
withhold jurisdiction over forcibly abducted defendants.
Federal officials cannot profit from an illegal search since
evidence obtained will be excluded in the subsequent trial;
they should not be encouraged to pursue unlawful means
of obtaining jurisdiction over a defendant, either.
119500 F.2d at 275.
COMMENTS
Courts have continued to countenance that rule
ignoring its constitutional implications, and thereby
rewarding the unlawful conduct of law enforcement
officers. It is certainly not necessary to limit the di-
vestiture of jurisdiction to those cases which "shock
the conscience" in the narrow due process sense. 12
The concept of due process is broader, and demands
that an accused be protected against pre-trial illegal-
ity by denying to the government the fruits of its
deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness. Kidnapping
"'
0See note 16 supra.
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and forcible removal of a defendant when legal
means are available for extradition or transfer is a
blatant act of lawlessness. Courts should begin to
evaluate this mode of acquiring jurisdiction rather
than merely repeating an outmoded rule that is open
to serious criticism. Thus far, such analysis is clearly
wanting. 12 As a result, a principle is adhered to
which conflicts with due process considerations, and
respect for law and the integrity of the judicial
process are thereby diminished.
12 See, e.g., United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270 (9th
Cir. 1975).
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JUVENILE CONFESSIONS: WHETHER STATE PROCEDURES ENSURE
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE CONFESSIONS
INTRODUCTION
In 1966, In re Gault' held that all children
within juvenile court jurisdictions are entitled to the
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination and
that juvenile confessions, to be admissible, must be
both voluntary and knowing. 2 Since this decision, the
issue of admissibility of juvenile confessions into
juvenile "civil" proceedings and criminal proceed-
ings, once juvenilejurisdiction has been waived, 3 has
been frequently litigated.
The change in the law creates difficulties for many
states. Prior to Gault, state Juvenile Court Acts had
not afforded children the constitutional privileges
now required. 4 Juvenile proceedings were forward-
looking in nature, focusing on the rehabilitation of
troublesome youths' rather than the protection of
their constitutional rights.
Nonetheless, in recognition of a child's inherent
frailties, legislatures and courts created statutory and
common law protections for juveniles. Courts must
1387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2Id. at 55.
IM. LEVIN & R. SARRI, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A
STUDY OFJUVENILE CODES IN U.S. (1974) [hereinafter cited
as LEVIN & SARRs].
Nearly every state has a statutory provision providing for
transfer of a child from the juvenile jurisdiction to adult
criminal jurisdiction. Transfer can occur if a child, usually
thirteen years or older, has committed an offense which, if
committed by an adult, would be a felony. The procedure
varies from state to state as to who may require the transfer
and whether a hearing or only an investigation is required
before juvenile jurisdiction is waived.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) concluded
that the District of Columbia transfer statute was "critical"
and as such required a hearing governed by due process
requirements. The following is a typical transfer statute:
In making its determination on a motion to permit
prosecution under the criminal laws, the court shall
consider among other matters ... (3) the age of the
minor; (4) the previous history of the minor; (5)
whether there are facilities particularly available to
the Juvenile Court for the treatment and rehabilita-
tion of the minor; and (6) whether the best interest of
the minor and the security of the public may require
that the minor continue in custody or under supervi-
sion for a period extending beyond his minority.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7 (3) (a) (1975).
4See note 45 infra.
5See notes 45-47 infra.
now decide if this protective philosophy will require
concrete procedures to guard juveniles during in-
terrogations. For example, should Miranda v.
Arizona 6 and Escobedo v. Illinois, 7 both of which
specified procedural safeguards for adults, now ap-
ply to children? Should parents, who are included
throughout a juvenile proceeding,' be required to
be present whenever a youth might confess? How
intertwined can the criminal and juvenile courts
become without damaging the "civil" design geared
to shelter children? Finally, how are the various
provisions of the juvenile codes to operate: as man-
dates, or merely as directives?
Five basic approaches have arisen in the last ten
years as states have struggled to reconcile their basic
presumptions concerning juveniles with Gault's con-
stitutional mandate. 9 Yet, rarely do these approaches
directly confront the problem of ensuring that a
juvenile's confession is extracted by constitutional
means. Since most states are reluctant to provide
extra procedural safeguards, children appear to be
losing their "need" status. This may unfortunately
result in an inadequate protection of their recently-
acquired fifth amendment right.
FEDERAL LAW REGARDING CONFESSIONS
The fifth amendment provides that no citizen shall
be forced to incriminate himself in any criminal
matter. "o To preserve this guarantee, self-incriminat-
ing statements are admissible into evidence only if
they are made voluntarily, and after a voluntary and
knowing waiver of one's fifth amendment privilege
has been given. 11
6384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7378 U.S. 478 (1964).
'See note 172 infra.
91n re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55.
" U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "[N] or shall [any-
one] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ... " The fourteenth amend-
ment prohibits state infringement of this privilege. Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
"Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Brown
established the "voluntariness" test. Prior to Miranda v.
Arizona it was the standard which governed the admis-
sibility of a confession or other incriminatory statement.
195
Prior to Miranda v. Arizona, " the Supreme Court
focused on whether the confession had been volun-
tarily given, consistently holding that confessions
involuntarily obtained violate the fifth amend-
ment' 3 this constitutional violation prohibits the
admission of the coerced confession into evidence. "'
The "voluntariness" requirement 15 was originally
established to stop the physical abuse too often used
to obtain confessions. 6 But the concept of coercion
has been expanded to include psychological as well as
physical "force," 17 both types of compulsion render-
ing a confession inadmissible.
Three reasons support the requirement that a
confession used in a judicial proceeding be voluntary.
First, a coerced confession is felt to be testimonially
unreliable. 1 Courts fear that an innocent man may
confess under fear and pressure, and then be con-
victed of an offense he did not commit. For example,
in Chambers v. Florida, 19 police randomly chose and
questioned thirty blacks regarding the murder of an
elderly white man. The first one who confessed,
Chambers, was charged with the crime. As a state-
ment of truth, Chambers' confession seems suspect.
Given after a week of grilling, Chambers' first
admission was rejected by the district attorney as
"384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), said
that the fourteenth amendment prevented state admittance
of involuntary confessions. Further, when a federal consti-
tutional issue is involved, federal law, as interpreted by the
Court, controls state interpretation of the right. "The
question of a waiver of a federally guaranteed constitutional
right is . . . a federal question controlled by federal law."
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966).
"Statements were held inadmissible in each of the
following cases: Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199
(1960) (mentally disabled man interrogated for nine hours);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (sustained police
pressure); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940)
(repeated solitary inquisitions); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278 (1936) (defendant was beaten).
"Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). "Due
Process" of the fifth and fourteenth amendments is violated
if a coerced confession is admitted.
"Id.
"Psychological as well as physical coercion makes a
confession involuntary. "There is torture of mind as well as
body; the will is as much affected by fear as by force."
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
'81n re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), 3 WIGNIORE,
EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940). The case of In re Carlo, 48
N. J. 224, 225 A.2d 110 (1966) illustrates the unreliability
of confessions obtained from frightened juveniles. Over a
six-hour interrogation period, two contradictory statements
were given by the youth. Both statements were proven
inaccurate by the autopsy report.
"9309 U.S. 227 (1940).
insufficient to establish his guilt. It took the defend-
ant another day to "invent" an acceptable confes-
sion-one that fit the crime that had been com-
mitted. The Supreme Court found the confession
totally unreliable as a statement of truth.
Second, involuntary confessions offend certain
societal values. The criminal law should not be used
as an instrument of unfairness since the possibility of
unfair and even brutal police tactics poses a real and
serious threat to civilized notions of justice.'"
The dignity and integrity of each citizen, which
deserve protection in a free society, are not main-
tained when one is forced to incriminate himself. "
In determining whether a confession is voluntary,
courts have analyzed the facts on a case-by-case
basis. " Looking at the "totality of the circum-
stances," courts assess many factors involved in a
confession to determine if it was indeed voluntary. 23
Various factors considered relevant are the length of
questioning, 24 the mental and physical limitations of
the accused,"5 the existence of inappropriate police
conduct, 26 and the defendant's access to supportive
people from outside the jailhouse.21
2'Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).
2"384 U.S. at 460. See Driver, Confessions and the So-
cial Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 42 (1968).
22McNabb v. United States, 142 F.2d 904 (6th Cir.
1944) ("voluntariness" is a question of fact).
2"Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (the record
presented a totality of coercive circumstances); Grant v.
Wainwright, 496 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1974) (no sleep,
interrogation by relays of police, fifty-three hours passed
before he was presented to the magistrate); United States v.
Blocker, 354 F. Supp. 1195 (D.D.C. 1973) (forced to strip,
mental deficiencies, police threats with promises of leni-
ency).
"Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (six-
teen days); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961)
(five days); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (seven
days).
"Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (sickness);
Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (mentally retarded
nineteen year-old); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199
(1960) (mental disability); United States v. Blocker, 354 F.
Supp. 1195 (D.D.C. 1973) (I.Q. of 70); People v. Price, 24
Ill. 2d 46, 179 N.E.2d 685 (1962) (two hours of questioning
passed before accused's second degree burns received medi-
cal attention).
"Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (deception),
Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (accused's
family was threatened); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940) (threatened with an angry mob).
"Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, rehearing denied,
(1962) (five days held incommunicado); Cotton v. United
States, 446 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1971) (questioned by a sole
postal officer alone); People v. Baker, 9 I11. App. 3d 654,
292 N.E. 2d 760 (1973) (denied twelve requests by youth to
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The "totality of the circumstances" standard was
later supplemented by several procedural safeguards.
First, the Supreme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois28
required that an attorney be available to an accused
starting at the "crucial stage" of police contact, once
the focus on an individual is accusatory and his
freedom of movement is restrained. 29 Second,
McNabb v. United States" and Mallory v. United
StateS3 1 held that confessions obtained during an
extended, unjustified delay in presenting an accused
to a magistrate, in violation of a federal rule of
procedure,32 are inadmissible as a matter of law.
Third, an accused must be given the warnings
required by Miranda v. Arizona 33 which inform the
accused of his constitutional rights. An intelligent,
knowing, and voluntary waiver of these rights must
then be made for any subsequent confession to be ad-
missible. 34 Unless these protective devices are used
to dispel "the compulsion inherent in custodial sur-
roundings,"' the Court reasoned that no statement
can be truly voluntary.
While these procedural requirements were estab-
lished to protect one's fifth amendement rights36 a
secondary benefit arose from their mandatory use.
Courts are partially relieved from the necessity of
looking for coercive influences in each confession."
If a presumption can be raised that the proce-
dure has decreased undue influence on the accused, a
less in-depth analysis may then be needed to deter-
mine the voluntariness of an admission.
Miranda has introduced not only a mandatory
procedure, but has changed the focus of analysis to
the issue of waiver. One must make a knowing,
see his parents); People v. Hester, 39 Ill. 2d 489, 237
N.E.2d 466 (1968) (youth was told he could see his mother
only if he confessed).
28378 U.S. at 492.
2"The right to an attorney begins even before interroga-
tion begins. Once the police have asked a citizen to come
with them for questioning the "accusatory stage" has
begun. Miller v. Warden, 338 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1964).
30318 U.S. 332 (1943).
31354 U.S. 449 (1957).
3 2 FED. R. CR0M. P. 5(a).
11384 U.S. at 444. Any person in custodial interrogation
must be informed of his right to be silent, the right to an
attorney during questioning, that if he cannot afford to re-
tain an attorney one will be appointed for him, and that any
statement may be used against him in a court of law.34 1d. at 444. Miranda does not apply to spontaneous
statements made by a defendant.
35Id. at 458.
38Id. at 463.
17People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714, 441 P.2d 625, 68
Cal. Rptr. 817 (1968).
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his fifth amend-
ment rights38 for any subsequent confession to be
constitutionally permissible as evidence. This
requirement minimizes the possibility that a funda-
mental guarantee will be relinquished out of igno-
rance or pressure. While there is a presumption
against waiver of one's constitutional rights,39 courts
analyze the character of a waiver in much the same
way they used to assess the voluntariness of the
confession, by examining the totality of the surround-
ing circumstances. "o
Therefore, a confession must withstand a three-
part analysis before it will be deemed a valid waiver
of an accused's privilege against self-incrimination.
First, procedural safeguards, including Miranda
warnings, must have been followed. 41 Second, the
interrogation proceedings must have been condu-
cive only to a voluntary and knowing waiver of one's
right to remain silent. Third, the confession itself
must have been voluntarily given. Case law man-
dates that these three "tests" be met before a con-
fession can be admitted into evidence. 41 Yet, as
will be seen later, in the context of juvenile confes-
sions, this analysis is not always followed. Unfortu-
nately, admissibility seems to hinge increasingly on
the judge's determination of whether the accused
made a valid waiver of his Miranda 3 rights, thus
overlooking the well-established "voluntariness"
test. 4
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AFFORDED JUVENILES
UNDER THE JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION
Juvenile Court Acts 4' arose in the early 1900's
and were designed to allow a state to control children
38384 U.S. at 444.
3 9Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See also
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
"United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1006 (1968).
41Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Mallory v. United States,
354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
342 (1943).
42 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444.
43See Note, Waiver of Riqhts in Police Interrogations:
Miranda in the Lower Courts, 36 U. CH. L. REV. 413,417
(1969).
44See notes 15 and 21 supra.
45Illinois enacted the first Juvenile Court Act in 1899.
By 1928 all but two states had followed suit. LEVIN &
SARRI, supra note 3.
In juvenile cases, the state, as parens patriae, was
given the task not to determine guilt or innocence of
the child, but rather what had best be done in his
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felt to be in need of guidance. 4 6 Using the concept of
parens patriae, 4 legislatures authorized broad dis-
cretionary powers to rehabilitate "troubled"
youths. 4 In the absence of effective parental control
or rearing of a child, legislators felt the welfare of
society necessitated taking control over such a youth.
Further, by operating as "civil proceedings," the
juvenile system was able to avoid the stigma of
criminal adjudication and to open the door to
treatment, not punishment, 49 for juveniles processed
through their courts.
However, the labeling of juvenile proceedings as
"civil" has allowed the courts to deprive juveniles of
certain constitutional liberties guaranteed to adults
in criminal proceedings. " Juvenile courts argued
that strict adherence to procedural regularity might
prevent their obtaining total disclosure of a child's
character and the offense in question. -' Full dis-
closure is seen as necessary to design an effective
treatment plan. Case law reflected the strong feeling
that a child, unlike an adult, had a right "not to
liberty but to custody.""52 Since parents need no
interest and in the interest of the state to save him
from a downward career.
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104,
119-120 (1909).
After the decisions in Gault and United States v. Kent,
and perhaps prompted by these cases, major revisions of all
but eight states' juvenile codes occurred. The amended
codes reflect and implement provisions to meet the newly
emphasized constitutional requirements. LEviN & SARRI,
supra note 3.
4 6Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198
(1905). The court in Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 I11. 328, 336,
100 N.E. 892, 895 (1913) held it was the "duty of... gov-
ernment, in its character of parens patriae, to protect and
provide for the comfort and well-being of such of its citi-
zens as, by reason of infancy... are unable to take care
of themselves."4
""Also sound is the ancient right of the state as parens
patriae to exercise its corrective influence over a minor in
the dispositional phase, once he is deemed to be deliquent
by methods of due process." J.C. Watkins, Jr., Parens
Patriae, Gault and Beyond, May 1968 (unpublished thesis
in Northwestern University Law School Library), at 66.
4 LEVIN & SARRI, supra note 3, at 1.4 9
/d.
50Id.
" Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts,
And Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775,794-95
(1966).
'2In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 17.
[Tihe Legislature surely may provide for the salva-
tion of such a child, if its parents or guardian he un-
able or unwilling to do so .... The natural parent
needs no process to temporarily deprive his child of
its liberty by confining it in his own home, to save it
and to shield it from the consequences of persistence
special procedure to deprive their children of liberty,
neither should the state when standing in the par-
ents' shoes. 53 In sum, courts did not require the
juvenile court systems to protect juvenile constitu-
tional rights, since the courts found no such rights
existing.
Disagreeing with the general position outlined
above, some federal 54 and state courts,5 5 had held by
the 1960's that juveniles were protected by "due
process" of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
Since children had been afforded constitutional rights
prior to the enactment of the various juvenile codes, 6
these courts disagreed that a juvenile court act could
now be "an instrument for the denial to a minor of a
constitutional right or of a guarantee afforded by law
to an adult." 5 7
However, it was not until 1966, in In re Gault,
that the United States Supreme Court squarely
addressed the issue of a child's constitutional rights.
The Court limited its holding to the due process
elements constitutionally required in a juvenile court
hearing. " Yet, the fifth and sixth amendment privi-
leges, which the Court held applicable to children,
begin even earlier than the hearing-once the
in a career of waywardness; nor is the state, when
compelled, as parens patriae, to take the place of the
father for the same purpose, required to adopt any
process as a means of placing its hands upon the child
to lead it into one of its courts.5 Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 50, 62 A. 198,
200 (1905).
"
4Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, rehearing denied,
370 U.S. 965 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948),
United States v. Morales, 233 F. Supp. 160 (D. Mont.
1964).
In a proceeding under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency
Act, "due process and fundamental fairness compel the
same safeguards for a juvenile as for an adult charged with
the same offense." United States v. Morales, supra at
164-65.
"I1n re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631
(1952).
"
6 People v. Flack, 125 N.Y. 324, 26 N.E. 267 (1891).
Juveniles have the right to notice of charges, a speedy public
jury trial, and generally can not be deprived of their liberty
without due process of law, whether the case is criminal
or "civil" in nature. "The Constitution is the highest
law; it commands and protects all." People v. Turner,
55 Ill. 280, 288 (1870).
" 109 Cal. App. 2d, at 789, 241 P.2d at 633. See also
Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483, 485 (D.D.C. 1960).
58387 U.S. 1 (1963).
59 1d. at 13. Gault involved the adjudication of a
fifteen year-old who was declared "delinquent" for alleg-
edly making obscene phone calls. Gault was "sentenced" to




child is in custody. 60 Citing Miranda as authority, 61
the Court held that no person, not even a juvenile,
can be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Since Miranda is effective once an individual is an
"accused" and in custody, Gault rights also become
effective at that point.
The procedural and substantive rights ofjuveniles,
which the Court found must be protected to satisfy
the due process requirement, 62 are as follows: (1)
notice of the charges; (2) right to counsel; (3) right to
confrontation and cross-examination; (4) privilege
against self-incrimination; (5) right to a transcript of
the proceedings; and (6) right to appellate review. 63
The Court in Gault countered arguments previ-
ously used to justify the denial of juvenile rights.
First, it disagreed that the unique benefits of the
juvenile court system, which gives a "treatment"
orientation without criminal stigmatization, would
"be impaired by constitutional domestication." 6 Nor
would the order and regularity introduced by the
constitutionally protective procedures destroy the
"kindly" atmosphere juvenile courts try to provide. 61
Second, lower courts had held that truth is the
ultimate goal of a juvenile proceeding, 6 6 and that a
confession was therapeutically beneficial for a
"°To deprive the minor at the accusatory stage of the
protection considered necessary for his protection
during the hearing is to repudiate the reasoning of
Escobedo which held that the interrogation was a
"critical stage" when legal aid and advice [and the
right against self-incrimination] were most critical.
Note, The Confessions of Juveniles, 5 WILLAMFTTE L. J.
66, 70 (1968).
61387 U.S. at 50 n.87, 56 n.97. The Court holds that the
Miranda warnings add order and certainty, which help
secure the fifth amendment.
21d. at 21, 27, 28. Finding that "due process of law"
is indispensable to individual freedom, the Court thought it
would be "extraordinary if our Constitution did not require
the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in
the phrase."63Id. at 10.
"
4 Id. at 22. The Court also questioned whether the
juvenile system which emphasizes rehabilitation, was pro-
ducing any benefit in exchange for the lack of individual
liberties.
Certainly, these figures and the high crime rates
among juveniles to which we have referred, could not
lead us to conclude that the absence of constitutional
protections reduces crime, or that the juvenile system,
functioning free of constitutional inhibitions as it has




61n re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 244, 225 A.2d 110, 121
(1966) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring).
youth. 6 These goals were facilitated by restricting
the juvenile's right against self-incrimination. Gault
disagreed with this reasoning by the lower courts.
Citing psychological studies,66 the Court agreed that
to induce a child to confess through the use of a
paternal atmosphere and then discipline the child,
would cause anti-therapeutic results. The child will
most likely become hostile and adverse, feeling he
had been tricked. 6'9
Thus, the Court's ultimate determination was that
juveniles, even under the juvenile jurisdiction, must
be afforded the same due process and fundamental
fairness safeguards given adults. The prior "unbri-
dled discretion"" in juvenile proceedings was
adjudged a poor substitute for procedures which are
vital to protect a child's potential loss of liberty. 7'
Gault held that a confession must meet two criteria
to be admissible into evidence. First, the confession
must be voluntary. 72 Second, it must not be made in
ignorance of one's fifth amendment rights. 73 The
same considerations which created the "voluntari-
ness" test in adult courts 74 support Gault's require-
ment that juvenile confessions be voluntary. First,
the personal liberty that our democracy should pre-
serve would be squelched if an individual, through
force of psychological domination, could be deprived
"of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state
in securing his conviction." Second, the Court
feared that if coaxed, a child might falsely accept
guilt. 76 Illustrative of this possibility is People v.
671n re Gault, 387 U.S. at 51.
6 1Id. at 51 n.90.
691n re Gault, 387 U.S. at 52.
"
0 Id. at 18.
7 Many cases, where the child is statutorily old enough,
and the crime committed if committed by an adult would be
a felony, may be transferred to criminal court where the
sanction is a "classical" loss of freedom-not just "cus-
tody." Further, even within the juvenile jurisdiction, an
admission exposes a juvenile to the loss of freedom through
detainment. So, the nature of the fifth amendment privilege
turns on the exposure a confession invites, not the specific
proceeding involved.
72387 U.S. at 55.
73 Id.
74 See notes 18 and 21 supra.
75387 U.S. at 47.76Id. at 45, quoting 3 WIGMIORE, EVIDENCE § 822 (3d
ed. 1940).
This possibility arises wherever the innocent person is
placed in such a situation that the untrue acknowledg-
ment of guilt is at the time the more promising of two
alternatives between which he is obliged to choose...
Id. at 47.
Simply stated, the Court's decision in this case rests
upon the considered opinion-after nearly four busy
years on the Juvenile Court bench during which the
19761
Hester. " In that case a fourteen year old was inter-
rogated for twelve hours while isolated from his pa-
rents and counsel and was not informed of his con-
stitutional rights. The court, in light of the total sit-
uation, admitted the statement into evidence. Yet
the confession seems highly unreliable as an admis-
sion of guilt. It directly contradicted the police ex-
planation of how the murder must have occurred;
also the youth could only devise a confession after he
was shown photos of the murder scene.
The second part of the Gault standard requires
that the juvenile know about his fifth amendment
privilege before he confesses. While Gault did not
directly hold that the Miranda warnings78 must be
given, courts since Gault have so held 7 -- probably to
ensure that the juvenile is aware of his rights.
Further, language in Gault points to the need for
"certainty and order"" 5 in receiving a confession,
and cites Miranda8 as a procedure necessary and
capable of ensuring constitutional rights.
However, Gault 2 and prior cases, Haley v. Ohio 
8 3
and Gallegos v. Colorado, 84 went beyond holding
testimony of thousands of such juveniles has been
heard-that the statements of adolescents under
18 ... who are arrested and charged with violations
of law are frequently untrustworthy and often distort
the law.
Id. at 55, citing In re Four Youths, Nos. 28-776-J, 28-
778-J, 28-783-5, 28-859-J, (D.C. Juv. Ct. 1961).
"139 II. 2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466 (1968).
78See note 33 supra.
"United States v. Fowler, 476 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.
1973); State v. Councilman, 105 Ariz. 145, 460 P.2d 640
(1969); In re M., 75 Cal. Rptr. 1, 450 P.2d 296 (1969),
People v. Baker, 9 Ill. App.3d 654, 292 N.E.2d 760 (1973);
State v. Loyd, 297 Minn. 442, 212 N.W.2d 671 (1973);
State v. Wright, 515 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. 1974); In re
Rust, 53 Misc. 2d 51, 278 N. Y. S.2d 333 (1967).
8 The Court in Gault held the juvenile's confession
made to the juvenile judge inadmissible, since the
process by which the "admissions" were obtained and
received must be characterized as lacking the
certainty and order which are required of pro-
ceedings of such formidable consequences.
387 U.S. at 56 (emphasis added).
8 387 U.S. at 56n.97. The court also agreed with the
procedural safeguards required in Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541 (1966). This case dealt with the due process
requirements of the hearing, necessary in the District of
Columbia, to transfer a child from the exclusive juvenile
jurisdiction to criminal jurisdiction.
82 "There is no place in our system of law for reaching a
result of such tremendous consequences without cere-
mony ..." 387 U.S. at 57, quoting Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 544 (1966). Further, the Court
emphasized that giving the Miranda warnings to a child
will not bear significant weight in determining the "vol-
untariness" requirement of the confession. 387 U.S. at 54.
83332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948).
84370 U.S. 49 (1962).
that juveniles cannot be adjudged by less than
constitutionally required due process methods. Chil-
dren are recognized as needing special care. "' While
giving no specifics, the Court found a different
standard necessary to assess whether a child's consti-
tutional privileges have been abused. For a child
"cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of
maturity. That which would leave a man cold and
unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his
early teens."" 6 Plus, a youth may not know how to
protect his own interests. As the Court in Gallegos
pointed out, where a fourteen-year-old was ques-
tioned incommunicado for five days regarding a
robbery, a child, in comparison with an adult, cannot
sense as fully the substantial consequences of a
confession. 87
Taking note of the inherent differences between
adults and children, the Supreme Court has de-
manded that special care and scrutiny be taken in
juvenile cases. Yet, states have been given great
leeway to experiment with methods they consider
sufficient to guarantee a youth's right against self-
incrimination. While Gault recognizes that special
problems may arise with a child's waiver of his fifth
amendment right 8 and that procedures may differ
depending upon the child's age and the presence and
competence of his parents or counsel,"8 no mandatory
procedures are set down. States are left with the
two-fold criteria to which admissible confessions
must adhere-a standard many states' procedures do
not seem to ensure.
JUVENILE STATUTORY AND CASE LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES
The law regarding the admissibility of an adult
confession places a strong emphasis on whether the
defendant's waiver of his right to remain silent was
both voluntary and knowing. 88 A defense frequently
raised in juvenile confession cases is that, as a matter
of law, juveniles are not competent to waive their
constitutional right against self-incrimination. 9, This
position, which has rarely been accepted as law,
92
"
5Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. at 599.
86Id.
8 7Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. at 54.




5United States v. Fowler, 476 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.
1973); 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202; People v. Lara, 62
Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 945 (1968);
Commonwealth v. Porter, 449 Pa. 153, 295 A.2d 311
(1972).82The only case found, which held that as a matter of
law a child could not make a knowing intelligent waiver of
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follows from two facts: children are generally
regarded as unable to enter legal transactions and are
presumed to lack the requisite intelligence to make a
valid waiver.
Due to their age and comparative immaturity,
children are commonly found incompetent to protect
their own interests. " As a result, both statutory and
judicial law have been developed to protect a child's
personal and property rights. " For example, minors
are not liable for their contracts; nor can they make
valid wills or marry without parental consent.
Logically, these limitations on a minor's legal
capabilities, largely based on a child's simple
inability to understand the ramifications of his acts, 95
should apply to waivers. For a waiver to be
constitutionally permissible, the individual must un-
derstand the full impact of dispensing with his
privilege against self-incrimination. Yet courts, con-
trary to the general legal presumptions about chil-
dren, maintain that a juvenile waiver is legally
possible. This position seems to be a necessity rather
than a sincere belief as to the depth of a child's
intelligence. If waivers were not possible, as a
matter of law, all admissions made by youths would
violate the fifth amendment. And confessions are often
the most effective, if not the only, tools available to
law enforcement officials. "
Merely establishing that a child has the legal
capability to waive his constitutional rights97 does
not foreclose the issue. Special problems still may
arise with juvenile waivers. 9' Some courts have held
that a youthful age will itself raise a presumption
against an intelligent waiver. In both Williams v.
Huff9 9 and Moore v. Michigan, 100 seventeen year
olds claimed that the waivers of their sixth amend-
his constitutional rights, is In Interest of S.H., 61 N.J. 108,
293 A.2d 181 (1972). Even here, the court narrowed its
holding to a ten-year old child.
93Williams v. Huff, 142 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1944),
remanded, 146 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
911d. at 92.
"Note, Waiver of Constitutional Rights by Winors: A
Question of Law or Fact?, 19 HAST. L.J. 223, 225 (1967).
OOSee Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology
of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REv. 42 (1968):
A confession has long been a valuable legal and
psycho-social commodity. Usually regarded as the
clearest evidence of guilt, it alleviates doubts in the
minds of judges and jurors more than any other
evidence and by itself largely ensures a conviction.
"The vast majority of cases have held that juvenile
waiver is a factual issue.
9 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55.
"Williams v. Huff, 142 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1944),
remanded 146 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
100355 U.S. 155 (1957).
ment right to counsel had not been given compe-
tently or intelligently. While both cases held that
the burden of proof was on the adolescent to show an
incompetent waiver, (a highly questionable position
since Miranda specifically places the burden of
showing an intelligent, knowing waiver on the
state, 1 if counsel is absent during questioning), they
also held that the defendant's age "creates an infer-
ence of fact that his waiver was not intelligent." 102
This presumption of an unintelligent waiver
seems to establish an even stronger presumption.
While all citizens are considered competent to waive
their constitutional rights, depending on the facts
of each case, 103 a strong presumption against the
release of such fundamental privileges exists. 104
Therefore, adding this basic presumption to the ex-
tra inference against a knowing, intelligent waiver
which arises from the youth of the accused, a double
presumption is created.
Applying the Adult "Totality" Standard to
Juvenile Confessions
Five basic formats"'0 for assessing the legality of
juvenile confessions are currently in use. All these
approaches incorporate the adult standard of scruti-
nizing the total situation 106 to see if a confession was
constitutionally obtained. Four approaches, the In-
diana rule, 10' exclusionary rule, "0' atmosphere requi-
101384 U.S. at 475 (while waiver need not be expressly
given in writing, silence is not a valid waiver).
102Williams v. Huff, 146 F.2d 867, 868 (D.C. Cir.
1945). See also 355 U.S. at 165-66.
I"3 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. at 490 n. 14.
"'Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
10 (1) The federal juvenile jurisdiction, Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Illinois, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania
use only the "totality of the circumstances", with age and
the presence of parents or counsel as factors to consider.
(2) Indiana disallows any confession made out of
the parent's presence, and both child and parent must be
informed of their right to an attorney. Lewis v. Indiana,
259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972).
(3) District of Columbia has adopted an exclusionary
rule. Any confession received prior to a child's transfer from
the exclusive juvenile jurisdiction to criminal court is
inadmissible in adult criminal court.
(4) Many states base their decision of admissibility on
where the confession is received, excluding from non-juve-
nile proceedings statements made within the friendly ju-
venile setting.
(5) New York excludes juvenile confessions if obtained in
violation of juvenile code provisions. Most states do not
hold a confession obtained, in violation of a statute
inadmissible per se.
1"'See notes 22-27 supra.
117McClintock v. State, 253 Ind. 333, 253 N.E.2d 233
(1969); Sparks v. State, 248 Ind. 429, 229 N.E.2d 642
(1967). See note 105(2) supra.
'Edwards v. United States, 330 F.2d 849, 850 (D.C.
site,"Ill and statutory mandate,"' supplement the
adult standard with additional criteria, giving the
extra protection ... children have been recognized as
needing. Yet, none of these standards squarely
confront the Gault mandate "' to ensure voluntary
and knowing juvenile confessions.
Most of the states examined, "3 the federal juvenile
jurisdiction, 14 and the Supreme Court 1 5 proceed
case by case, analyzing the specific factual context in
which a confession is received. Only the minimal
procedural requirements have been set forth. 16
Some factors, such as the presence of parents during
questioning, " are considered only when the accused
is a child. Yet, most other circumstances evaluated in
juvenile cases are important in all confession cases.
The age of a defendant is interpreted as undercut-
ting the voluntariness of the confession"' 8 or the
Cir. 1964); Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C.
Cir. 1961). See note 105 (3) supra.
""
9State v. Loyd, 297 Minn. 442, 212 N.W.2d 671
(1973); State v. Wright, 515 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. 1974); State
v. Gullings, 244 Ore. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966). See note
105(4) supra.
11In re M., 44 A.2d 791, 355 N.Y.S. 2d 117 (1974),
In re Aaron D., 30 App. Div. 2d 183, 290 N.Y.S. 2d 935
(1968). See note 105(5).
"'In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 56; Gallegos v. Colorado,
370 U.S. at 54; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. at 600.
12 It should be kept in mind that the Gault standard is
the standard by which to evaluate a juvenile's confession
when obtained under juvenile jurisdiction, whether admis-
sibility is sought in the juvenile court or criminal court
following jurisdictional transfer.
"'See note 105(1) supra.
'4United States v. Fowler, 476 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.
1973); Cotton v. United States, 446 F.2d 107 (8th Cir.
1971).
"'
5See note 111 supra.
'"See 18 U.S.C. § 5035 (1970) which requires bringing
a minor, once arrested, before a juvenile officer without
unnecessary delay. This procedure is comparable to FED.
R. CR1 1. P. 5(a). See United States v. DeMarce, 513 F.2d
755 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Binet, 442 F.2d 296
(2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Glover, 372 F.2d 43 (2d
Cir. 1967).
"'State v. Hardy, 107 Ariz. 583, 491 P.2d 17 (1971)
(presence of child's parents and a consent by them to waiver
of rights is one factor in determining voluntariness);
People v. Hester, 39 I11. 2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466 (1968)
(refusal by police for child to see his parents prior to con-
fession); In re S.H., 61 N.J. 108, 293 A.2d 181 (1972)
(child should be interviewed in presence of his parents).
118People v. Connolly, 33 Ill. 2d 128, 210 N.E.2d 523,
(1965).
Minority is simply another factor to be considered in
determining voluntariness, and there is no distinct or
separate rule of evidence applicable to the confession
of minors.
State v. Lytle, 194 Neb. 353, 358, 231 N.W.2d 681, 686
(1975).
understanding of a confession's repercussions. '9
Courts rarely find age alone sufficient to invalidate
a confession. 12 However, when combined with
an impermissibly long interrogation, 21 a mental
deficiency beyond mere immaturity,122 a fear-
provoking atmosphere, 13 or interrogation without
the presence of a familiar adult, 124 the confession can
become impermissible as violating the youth's right
against self-incrimination.
Judicial discretion cannot be avoided. Yet, with no
clear-cut rules which could protect a child who is not
as mature or knowledgeable as an adult, courts are
left without clear touchstones by which to evaluate a
particular confession. Arguably, then, a child is in
the same position as an adult. Law enforcement offi-
cers need to follow no extra regulations. Contrary to
the Court's declaration"12 that children, differing
from adults, may require different techniques, this
discretionary policy, the "totality of the circum-
stances," may fail to meet the Gault standard. 126
Exclusionary Rule
Harting v. United States 1 established the Dis-
trict of Columbia's exclusionary rule, a rule no other
jurisdiction has adopted. It prohibits any confession
received prior to waiver of juvenile jurisdiction from
being used in adult court, once the juvenile is
transferred to adult court. ,2' While the court estab-
lished a clear-cut rule which seems to alleviate the
need for judicial discretion, it fails to state how a
juvenile confession may constitutionally be received.
Such a standard is still necessary to review any
challenged confessions of adolescents who remain
within the juvenile system. Thus, since no proce-
19In re Williams, 49 Misc. 2d 154, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91
(1966).
"2'In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. at 467.
121People v. Hester, 39 Ill. 2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466
(1968) (twelve hour interrogation). Contra, Cotton v.
United States, 446 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1971) (two hours
detention).
12People v. Devine, 17 Il1. App. 3d 1053, 309 N.E.2d
76 (1974) (mental age seven, only 2.5 grade reading level);
Bean v. State, 234 Md. 432, 199 A. 2d 773 (1964) (fifteen
year old with a 74-80 I.Q.); State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 7,
419 P.2d 219 (1966) (fifteen year old mental patient).
121n re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 225 A. 2d 110 (1966).
12 45ee note 117.
"2'In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55.
1261d.
' 
2 Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir.
1961).12 8See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2307 (1973) (which al-
lows transfer of adolescents from juvenile to criminal juris-
diction, depending on the offense and minor's age).
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dural guidelines are given, reliance rests solely on
the police, and later the judges, to receive confes-
sions in compliance with the fifth amendment.
Harling involved the admissibility of a statement
made in police custody prior to waiver of thejuvenile
jurisdiction. Two weeks later, the seventeen year old
was transferred to criminal court on a robbery charge
and the state introduced the confession as evidence.
In reversing the district court's admission of the
statement, the Court of Appeals gave two reasons for
establishing an exclusionary rule. First, the court
held that fundamental fairness would be offended if
admissions made by the child in the non-criminal and
non-punitive setting of juvenile proceeding(s)
[were] used later for the purpose of securing
his criminal conviction and punishment. 129
If this consideration was the court's only concern,
interrogation in an unfriendly police atmosphere
need only have been required. "" However, the court
preferred to establish a solid barrier between the
juvenile and criminal courts. "', Without this divi-
sion, the court feared that the juvenile system would
become an appendage of the criminal system, which
in turn might destroy the parenspatriae relationship
between the child and the juvenile court. Thus, the
exclusionary rule seems designed more to preserve
the integrity of the juvenile system 132 than to ensure
valid confessions. The courts do not address the Gault
standard, despite the need to test the constitutionality
of confessions used in juvenile proceedings.
Atmospheric Requisite Standard
The atmosphere in which the juvenile is ques-
tioned creates an important distinction in some
jurisdictions. 133 A rule has developed in Minnesota, 134
Missouri, "'and Oregon 116 which allows a confession
12 Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d at 163.
1 3 See notes 133-44 infra.131Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d at 163, citing
Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 558 (D.C. Cir.):
[Firom the moment a child commits an offense, "in
effect he is exempt from the criminal law" unless and
until the Juvenile Court waives its jurisdiction.1
*
2Edwards v. United States, 330 F.2d 849, 850 (D.C.
Cir. 1964). This case, factually similar to Harling, followed
precedent and excluded the boys' confessions which had
been made prior to transfer. Yet the victim's identification
of the boys, which might have been impossible but for the
confessions, was allowed into evidence in the robery
prosecutions.
"'lMinnesota, Missouri, and Oregon.
"4State v. Loyd, 297 Minn. 442, 212 N.W.2d 671
(1973).
'State v. Wright, 515 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. 1974); State
made prior to waiver of juvenile jurisdiction to be
admissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding if the
confession is received by a police officer, instead of a
juvenile officer. This practice attempts to fulfill the
second part of the Gault standard which requires a
knowing confession. 137
Statutes restricting the use of juvenile confessions
have been enacted in the above jurisdictions:
[Any evidence given by the child in the juvenile
court shall not be admissible as evidence against him
in any case or proceeding in any other court.... 138
However, this particular statute did not prevent a
Minnesota court from admitting ajuvenile confession
into a criminal prosecution. 13 In State v. Loyd. 140
a mentally deficient sixteen year old was questioned,
outside the presence of his parents or counsel, and
acknowledged his involvement in a robbery to a
police officer. Satisfied that the adolescent had
received the required Miranda warnings, the court
held that a proper, intelligent waiver of his fifth
amendment guarantee had been made. Awareness of
possible criminal responsibility, which can be im-
puted from the fact that the police handled the inter-
rogation, 14' is sufficient to create an "intelligent"
confession.
Apparently, the fear that the friendly, permissive
atmosphere of the juvenile court will prevent a real
understanding of a confession's consequences is
alleviated when a police officer is the interrogator. 4'
"So long as it is made clear to the juvenile that the
questioning authorities are not operating as his
friends but as his adversaries," 143 sufficient warning
of the gravity of a confession is held to exist. 141
v. Sinderson, 455 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. 1970). In both these
Missouri cases parents were present during questioning.
Contra, State v. Rone, 515 S.W.2d 438 (Mo. 1974).
'
36 State v. Phillips, 245 Ore. 466, 422 P.2d 670 (1967);
State v. Gullings, 244 Ore. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966).
"'See notes 94-104 supra.
131MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.211 (1971). See also N. Y.
FAMILY CT. AcT § 783 (1963):
[Nior any confession.., made by him to the court
or to any officer thereof in any stage of the proceeding
is admissible as evidence against him or his interests
in any other court.
This type of statutory provision is common in state
juvenile acts.
' 'See MINN. STAT. ANN § 260.125(1) (1971).
0297 Minn. 442, 212 N.W.2d 671 (1973).
1 IId. at 448, 212 N.W.2d at 677.
11251 N.D.L. REv. 205, 207 (1974).
11
3 State v. Phillips, 245 Ore. 466, 471, 422 P.2d 670,
672 (1967), quoting State v. Gullings; 244 Ore. 173, 416
P.2d 311 (1966).
.
4 See note 135; State v. Rone, 515 S.W.2d 438
1976]
Assuming the validity of this position, ' under-
standing may increase, but at the cost of "volun-
tariness"-a vital characteristic of any constitution-
ally permissible confession. One empirical study,
done in California, 46 tested the effect Miranda
warnings had on an adolescent's understanding of his
fifth amendment privilege. Police custody was found
to undermine the understanding the warnings did
give the juveniles. While 98 per cent of the youths
understood that they could remain silent, 29 per cent
felt obligated to talk to the police. "'
Apparently knowledge is often subordinate to [one's]
mental state at the time of arrest confrontation. Per-
haps the difference between knowledge of the right to
silence and subjective feeling of a necessity to talk is
explained by the findings that 60 per cent felt it would
go against them if they remained silent [and] 74 per
cent felt it would benefit them to talk.... 148
Mandatory Presence of Parents or Counsel During
Questioning
The most frequent recommendation made by state
courts, 149 the federal courts, 158" and various commis-
(Mo. 1974). The court here went even further. A juvenile
officer was present while police interrogated the youth.
Still, the presence of the juvenile officer was held insuffi-
cient to bring the statement within Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.-
271(3) (Vernon 1959). The confession was admissible.
... Results of a study done in New Haven may indirectly
support the proposition that an adversary, police atmos-
phere will increase overall understanding. A prior record
was the most important factor in cases where a confession
was not obtained; a greater knowledge of what the
interrogation might lead to helps one maintain his right
against self-incrimination. Note, Interrogations in New




'Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7




9State v. Hardy, 107 Ariz. 583, 491 P.2d 17 (1971);
People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 491 P.2d 793, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1971); People v. Lara, 67 Cal 2d 365, 432 P.2d
202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586, (1967); In re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224,
225 A.2d 110 (1966).
Some states, such as Illinois, which includes the absence
of family members during a child's questioning as just one
factor within the total context, seem interested only in
whether an intelligent waiver of fifth amendment exists.
People v. Devine, 309 N.E.2d 76, 17 Ill. App. 3d 1053




50 1n re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Gallegos v.
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596
(1948); United States v. Fowler, 476 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.
1973).
sions 1.' is that an adolescent's parents, guardian, or
counsel be available to the child during police
questioning. However, only Indiana has adopted
this recommendation as a mandatory practice,
which, if not followed, prevents the use of any
confession received."'5 Having a responsible adult
with a child during interrogation is designed to
increase the youth's understanding of his rights and
the consequence of their waiver'" 3 and to lessen the
fear and compulsion to talk, ' all essential factors
for a constitutionally permissible confession.
An accused's ability to comprehend is often consid-
ered by courts, ' whether an adult or a child is
involved. Mental retardation,' S a low I.Q.,"17 or
lack of education "s can play an integral part in
persuading a court that a confession was not "know-
ingly" given. Beyond these special factors, normal
children are also seen as handicapped by their
natural immaturity. 1"9 Courts have recognized that
children often "lack the judgment to appreciate the
seriousness of the situation and harm which they may
do themselves by yielding to the pressure of insistent
police questioning." 160
The California study, 16' which used ninety adoles-
"'In re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 241, 225 A.2d 110, 119
(1966), citing Standards for Specialized Court Dealing
with Children (Children's Bureau, Dept. of Health, Ed-
ucation, and Welfare 1954) at 39.
Whenever possible, a child should be interviewed in the
presence of his parents or guardian. In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967), citing The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society,
REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 86-87
(1967); 41 CALIF. S.B.J. 798, 803 (1966), citing Commit-
tee on Criminal Law and Procedure of the California Bar.
The committee proposed that "no statement taken from
a juvenile under eighteen ... be utilized in any subse-
quent criminal proceeding unless made in the presence of
an attorney." Model Rules for Juvenile Court of Evidence
25 (1969), proposed by Council of Judges of the National
Council on Crime and Deliquency.
'
15 Lewis v. Indiana, 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138
(1972).
... Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962).
1.4 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
1I People v. Devine, 17 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 309 N.E.2d
76 (1974); People v. Hester, 39 I11. 2d 489, 237 N.E.2d
466 (1968).
15 Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
"'People v Baker, 9 Il1. App. 3d 654, 292 N.E.2d 760
(1973) (I.Q. 72).
"'
8Gilbert v. Beto, 274 F. Supp. 847 (S.D. Tex. 1967)
(only a seventh grade education).
"'
9Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1962).
1.01n re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 241, 225 A.2d 110, 119
(1966).
6I Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7
SAN DIEoO L. REV. 39 (1970).
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cents, ages twelve to seventeen, with varying back-
grounds, concluded that children do not always
completely comprehend their constitutional rights or
waiver of these rights. Such a defect results in an
inadmissible confession. 162 Only four juveniles, out of
the ninety tested, 163 had a perfect score of under-
standing. And, even more significant, only 27 per cent
of the youths comprehended that they had a right to
an attorney during interrogation. 164
A second consideration, which prompted having a
parent or counsel available, parallels a basic factor
of the "voluntary" test. Incommunicado interroga-
tion has been condemned as inherently compul-
sive. 165 Hopefully, the presence of a familiar adult
will decrease the powerlessness and fear a child,
more so than an adult, 1 66 undoubtedly feels. 167
One wonders if the presence of this "friendly
adult" will create the intended results. Parents,
possibly ashamed and/or angered that their child is
1621n re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55.
"'The adolescents were given the Miranda warnings
and then their comprehension was tested. The overall
percentage of understanding of each group was as follows:
Right to Remain Silent
The Use of the Right
Right to an Attorney at Trial
Right to an Attorney during Ques-
tioning.









Ferguson & Douglas, supra note 161, at 48.
"'4 Another study in the area also questioned the validity
of the warnings. Note, Interrogations in New Haven: The
Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1563 (1967): "In
our estimation, warnings were a factor in reducing the
success of interrogation in only eight of the 81 cases which
could be evaluated." The Yale study involved all age groups
and found those who had never been through such an or-
deal before-first offenders-needed the most protection.
165Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 458.
""
6 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49,54 (1962). A child
"cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of his
senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his ad-
missions."
""7Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600 (1948). "He needs
someone on whom to lean lest the overpowering presence of
the law, as he knows it, crush him."
State v. Hardy, 107 Ariz. 583, 584, 491 P.2d 17, 18
(1971). "The presence of the child's parents ... is only
one of the elements to be considered.., in determining
that the statement was voluntary."
In re Williams, 49 Misc. 2d 154, 165, 267 N.Y.S.2d
91,106 (Fam. Ct. 1966). "The failure of the police to notify
this child's parents that he had been taken into custody,
... is germane on the issue of its [confession] voluntary
character."
in custody, may further coerce the child into owning
up to the alleged offense, instead of affording the
youth shelter. Moreover, a parent may be no more
knowledgable than the juvenile about constitutional
rights and the consequences of a confession. United
States v. Fowler'6" is a good illustration of this
point. Fowler, a sixteen year old, was interrogated
by a postal officer regarding a burglary. The confes-
sion, given in the presence of his father, was held
inadmissible because it was not knowingly or volun-
tarily given. The court found not only an invalid
Miranda warning, but that "[w]hat Fowler needed
at the time was counsel and support.... The fa-
ther, however, did not fill this need."169 Fowler's
father was as upset and ignorant of his son's options
as Fowler himself. Perhaps increased understanding
and decreased compulsion would be better met by
requiring counsel "as a matter of course whenever
coercive action is a possibility, without requiring
choice by the child or parent." 17
0
Even though the above procedure may not accom-
plish the result desired, Indiana has, in adopting
this rule, directly addressed the two-part analysis of
Gault. 171 While California and New Jersey implic-
itly '"recommended that a parent or counsel be pres-
ent 173 Indiana adopted a per se rule to ensure that
confessions admitted into evidence were acquired by
constitutional means. "' Since Indiana courts specif-
ically hold that a child cannot make a knowing 71or
168476 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1973).
'191d. at 1093, quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596,
600 (1948).
170In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 40 n.65.
1711d. at 55.
172CAL. WELF. & INsT'Ns CODE § 627.5, 634, 700
(1972); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2A; 4-55 (1974). Both states'
juvenile codes involve a minor's parents or guardian in
every stage of the juvenile proceedings, including their
being informed of the minor's constitutional rights. There-
fore, it is held advisable to have the parent or guardian
present during the questioning and to have their consent to
the minor's fifth amendment rights being waived.
173 People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 586 (1967); In re S.H., 61 N.J. 108, 293 A.2d 181
(1972). For instance, in one ease the court held that the
police should see that a parent or some relative or friend is
present to allay the fear or pressure a youngster could feel in
strange hands and a strange setting. In re Carlo, 48 N.J.
224, 235, 225 A.2d 110, 121 (1966).
174 [T]he true test as to the admissibility of a con-
fession is that it be voluntarily made and that in mak-
ing it the accused was aware of the probable conse-
quences of his act.
Sparks v. State, 248 Ind. 429, 432, 229 N.E.2d 642, 645
(1967).




voluntary 176 waiver while alone, an admission is
inadmissible if the child's parents or attorney are not
informed of his constitutional rights, allowed to
consult with the youth regarding waiver, and present
during questioning. "' Clearly, if the Indiana rule
warrants criticism, it stems from the actual effect this
procedure has on a child, not from the court's
analysis of the problem.
Statutory Violation
Each state's juvenile system is governed by the
statutory provisions of its Juvenile Court Act. The
thrust of these systems is the care, protection, and
rehabilitation of children coming within their pur-
view. 17' Yet, most jurisdictions allow these acts to be
violated without the imposition of any sanctions. 179
Only New York 8" and the Federal Juvenile Sys-
tem "'i consistently implement these legislative man-
dates by finding confessions obtained in violation of
specific statutes inadmissible per se. Their positions
follow the Supreme Court's rationale underlying the
Mallorv-McNabb rule. 192
Most state courts have rejected a per se conse-
quence to a statutory violation. For example, New
Jersey has a statute which prohibits placing a child
under sixteen in a police station. 183 The New Jersey
courts recognize that the legislative purpose of this
statute is to protect a child from a frightening
atmosphere which "is likely to have harmful effects
on the mind and will of the boy." 184 Yet, violation of
this statute is just one factor to be weighed against
the voluntariness of a confession received in police
quarters. 18'
Illinois, 596 Minnesota, 1"7 Missouri, 1s8 and Ore-
... Lewis v. Indiana, 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138
(1972).
1771d.
11"ln re Patterson, 210 Kan. 245, 499 P.2d 1131
(1972).
"'lllinois, Missouri, New Jersey, and Oregon have all
rejected the position that a violation of the juvenile act
renders any confession obtained therein inadmissibleper se.
180Violation of N. Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 724(a), (1963)
while obtaining a confession, will result in its inadmissibil-
ity.
11 Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 5035 (1970) will also result
in a confession's exclusion from evidence, if the admission
occurred during the violation.
1 82See text accompanying notes 30, 31, 32, 116 supra.
"'
5N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 4-57 (1974);
"'In re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 239, 225 A.2d 110, 118
(1966).
18d.
"'People v. Connolly, 33 Ill.2d 128, 210 N.E.2d 523
(1965); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-9 (1973).
"'State v. Loyd, 297 Minn. 442, 212 N.W.2d 671
(1973), MINN. STAT. ANN. 260.21(1) (1971).
gon " 9 all avoid an exclusionary statute by interpret-
ing the prohibition against the use of statements re-
ceived under the juvenile court's jurisdiction as not
including statements given to police officers. Still
other courts rationalize that a particular violation of
a Juvenile Act provision may be discounted as in-
sufficiently grievous to prohibit the use of the con-
fession obtained. 190
Contrary to this majority approach, New York has
consistently required full compliance with section
724 of the New York Family Court Act.191 No
confession is admissible into evidence if obtained
from a juvenile prior to notifying his parents or rel-
ative and releasing the adolescent to them or the
Family Court.'9 2 In In re Rust' 93 and In re Ad-
dison, "" where children were questioned before
their parents were contacted, the courts justified
their holdings solely on the basis of statutory con-
struction. ' 95 The Juvenile Act had been violated; the
sanction was to declare the confession inadmis-
sible as a matter of law.
The Illinois Juvenile Court Act is similar to that
of New York. "'5 A law enforcement officer, who takes
a minor into custody without a warrant, must
immediately make a reasonable attempt to notify the
child's parents or guardian, and, without unneces-
sary delay, take the minor to the nearest juvenile
1
s
9 State v. Wright, 515 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. 1974),
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211. 271 (3) (Vernon 1959).
""
9 State v. Gullings, 244 Ore. 173,416 P.2d 311 (1966).
191 State v. Phillips, 245 Ore. 466, 422 P.2d 670 (1967);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.575 (1975), which prohibits juve-
niles from being questioned in jail, was violated. However,
the court decided that the purpose of the statute was
satisfied since the child was not in contact with adult
criminals. Contra, In re K.W.B., 500 S.W.2d 275 (Mo.
1973).
The court supported the exclusion of any confession
obtained without the child's constitutional rights first being
discussed with parents, attorney, or an adult friend by the
fact that several code provisions involved a child's parents.
\4o. ANN. STAT. §§§ 211.031, 211.04, 211.101 (Vernon
1959).
'
91N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT. § 724 (1963).
1921n re M. 44 App. Div. 2d 791, N.Y.S.2d 117 (1974);
In re Aaron D., 30 App. Div. 2d 183, 290 N.Y.S.2d 935
(1968); In re Addison, 20 App. Div. 2d 90, 245 N.Y.S.2d
243 (1963); In re Rust, 53 Misc. 2d 51, 278 N.Y.S.2d
333 (1967); In re Williams, 49 Misc. 2d 154, 267
N.Y.S.2d 91 (1966).
'931n re Rust, 53 Misc. 2d 51, 278 N.Y.S.2d 333
(1967).
19'In re Addison, 20 App. Div. 2d 90, 254 N.Y.S.2d
243 (1963).
'9"Contra, in re Williams, 40 Misc. 2d 154, 267
N.Y.S.2d 91 (1966). Here, the court held the non-com-
pliance contradicted the finding of a voluntary confession.
'"ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37 § 703-2 (1973).
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officer. 107 Yet, these two states reach opposite results
when these provisions are violated. Illinois has
repeatedly held '" that failure to comply with section
3-2 does not render a confessioninadmissible. The
Illinois courts support their position with the fol-
lowing rationale:
[P] roper police investigation of a minor, or the admis-
sion of... confessions obtained by the police, [does
not] thwart or subvert the purpose of the Juvenile
Court Act.... The Act was not intended to erect a
shield between minors and criminal prosecution...
but, to accomplish rehabilitation .... 19"
Clearly, in the face of the transfer provisions in
nearly every jurisdiction,2 "0 juvenile acts have not
been designed to isolate adolescents, from criminal
processes. Yet the reasoning of the states which allow
code violations 20 ' ignores the mandatory nature of
various code provisions. The creation of separate
juvenile jurisdictions illustrates the legislative intent
to afford the juvenile protections in addition to those
he already possesses under the Federal Constitution.
The legislative intent was to enlarge, not diminish
these protections.2 "2 Therefore, the violation of a
protective provision designed to bolster a child's
natural weakness should raise a strong, if not
conclusive, presumption that the juvenile was not
afforded enough protection to ensure a voluntary,
knowing confession. Since it would not meet the
Gault standard, such a confession should be inad-
missible as a violation of the youth's fifth amendment
right. 20
1 7 1d.
'People v. Simmons, 60 Ill. 2d 173, 326 N.E.2d 383
(1975); People v. Steptore, 51 Ill. 2d 208, 281 N.E.2d 642
(1972); People v. Zepeda, 47 Ill. 2d 23, 265 N.E.2d 647
(1970).
19 People v. Zepeda, 47 Ill. 2d 23, 29, 265 N.E.2d 647,
650 (1970).
2
'LEVIN & SARRI, supra note 3.
2
"1See notes 179, 198 supra.
202United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899, 902
(D.D.C. 1958).
2
'United States v. DeMarce, 513 F.2d 755 (8th Cir.
1975); United States v. Binet, 442 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971);
United States v. Glover, 372 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1967).
All of these cases disallowed confessions obtained in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 5035 (1948). The court in United
States v. Glover, supra, reasoned that
Section 5035 evidences a strong Congressional con-
cern with the protection of the rights of juveniles ....
There is here no hint of any purpose to allow deten-
tion for any other objective than prompt arraignment
before ajudicial officer, so that the magistrate may ex-
plain and protect the juvenile's rights-among others,
the right against compulsory self-incrimination ....
The Act makes plain the concern of the Congress that
While Miranda and Escobedo are applicable to
juvenile cases, other protective provisions in vari-
ous juvenile codes-such as the provision in forty
states which parallels Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 5(a)-do not receive the same attention.
Nor do their violations result in the same conclusive
presumptions. This inconsistent position ignores
the purpose of the juvenile codes, prevents the secur-
ing of protection a child needs, and increases the
possibility of admitting unconstitutional juvenile
confessions.
CONCLUSION
Two basic faults exist with the present laws
regarding juvenile confessions. First, with few
exceptions, the problem is not carefully analyzed.
The two essential elements of a permissible confes-
sion-voluntariness and knowingness-should be
separately considered, and have procedures designed
to ensure the existence of both characteristics. Sec-
ond, juvenile confessions are often handled in the
same fashion as adult confessions. A child, while
under the juvenile jurisdiction, is recognized as
needing special protection. Yet courts often use no
extra precautions when a juvenile has been inter-
rogated, and his age becomes just one factor to be
considered. Time may be saved since police and
courts will be less encumbered. But the underlying
goals of each juvenile act, rehabilitation and protec-
tion, become increasingly improbable. Further-
more, a child's recently-proclaimed constitutional
guarantees may be violated.
Therefore, to ensure voluntary and knowing
confessions, juveniles should be given at least the
safeguards afforded adults. Miranda warnings must
be given. An attorney should be present if requested.
And, as California has held, 204 a child's request for
his parents is comparable to an adult's request for an
attorney. Also, the Juvenile Court Acts should serve
as the procedural guidelines for juvenile interroga-
tion. Gault stressed the advantages for clear-cut pro-
cedures in preserving constitutional rights.202 For
those of adolescent age be kept separate from hardened
adult offenders. We may assume that it was no less
concerned with the greater need of the young and in-
experienced for independent, unbiased advice as to the
right to counsel and the right to refrain from self-in-
crimination, when interrogated by the police authori-
ties.
204 People v. Burton, 3 Cal. 3d 375, 380, 491 P.2d 793,
798, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1971).
251n re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967), quoting Malinski
v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
separate opinion): "The history of American freedom is, in
no small measure, the history of procedure."
1976]
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example, forty states have provisions comparable
to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a). Yet, its
violation does not raise the presumption that a con-
fession so obtained is involuntary. To ignore the
juvenile code provisions is to undermine their
raison d'9tre: to protect and rehabilitate children.
Holding that a code violation raises a conclusive
presumption that any confession obtained was
[Vol. 67
neither voluntary or knowing, may prompt the
police to obey statutes which bring thejuvenile court
officers and/or parents into the picture before a
juvenile is questioned. Further requiring the pres-
ence of independent counsel seems to be the logi-
cal extension of the Gault reasoning, and, combined
with the above suggestions, will ensure that the
juvenile fifth amendment right is a reality.
